http://www.unburdenus.org

I am posting this message to about 10 different veterans related
forums in search of beta testers for a new Veterans Health Care web
application. In order to help you understand what the application is I
feel it is best to outline the problem and then explain how we are
going about addressing a portion of the need.

The Problem:

Recently an article was published in the Washington Post which
outlined some serious issues with the VA health care system. Alot of
the issues outlined in the most recent media blitz are things that
veterans who have used VA health facilities are all to familiar with.
These issues have been going on for decades. Unfortunately as seems to
happen with the media as new issues in life come up others are pushed
aside. However, we still have millions of veterans who are in need of
ongoing quality health care, and hundreds more are coming into the
system everyday, either as a result of injuries sustained in the wars
in Iraq or Afghanistan or because of injuries sustained while serving
their country.

Our piece of the solution:

After reading these articles I came to realize that as with so many
other issues the media would blitz this one heavily until something
else arose, and then move on. Since I am the founder of unburdenus.org
and we were in the process of developing an application to track side
effects from medication, I felt we could easily switch gears
temporarily and create an application which would allow veterans to
share stories of what they have experienced in the VA health care
system, and submit it to a central location where it can then be
compiled along with the stories of other veterans.

Having a compilation of stories (experiences) in a central location is
of great benefit to everyone involved. It provides a single point of
presence for veterans to join together as a group with a unified
voice. It provides researchers a single point in which they can
compile facts and figures which will help them spot trends. And since
the stories are open to anyone who has internet access individuals,
special interest groups, congressional members etc., all will have
access to the data made available to us by veterans.

One final note. This is a totally free service.

How can you help:

We need beta testers to use the site in the following way.

Check out the main page.

Create an account: use fake or dummy info to create an account.

check your email for a welcome letter.

Login

Create a story by filling out all of the fields with dummy info.

When you get to the text box at the bottom of creating a story copy
and paste the info below into the text field and fill it out so we can
have your feedback.

1. Is the mission of the site easy to understand?

2. Is the site easy to navigate?

3. Did you experience any areas where the site lagged?

4. Are there any features you feel should be added to enhance the data
being collected?

5. Are there any features you feel should be added to enhance the
users experience?

6. Anything else you would like to add?

Once you have copied and pasted the questions and your answers into
the text box hit submit and then check out the stories.

After you have done so, spread the word, and if you know of any
reporters who would be interested in doing a story on this please
point them in my direction.

Also, in closing, keep your eyes peeled on this site, our next efforts
will include medication side effects tracking, hurricane and natural
disaster govt. and insurance issues tracking and Human rights abuses
tracking.

Best Regards,

Dave

    Do you really believe Bush has the time to listen?
    What about the departments and people below?

                 -----------------------

   BRADLEY S. BARTON, NATIONAL COMMANDER, DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS
   -----------------------------------------------------------------
      http://www.nationalveteransday.org/speakers/barton.htm

      DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS NATIONAL CEMETERIES
   -------------------------------------------------------
         http://www.cem.va.gov/CEM/cems/listcem.asp

          DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
   -------------------------------------------------------
     http://www.hhs.gov/about/bios/asstsechealth.html

              OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
    -------------------------------------------------
               http://www.va.gov/oig

Cho, a 23-year-old Virginia Tech senior described as a troubled
loner, bought his guns legally through gun shops before gunning
down 32 people on campus, then killing himself.

No motive has been established for his rampage.

    Careful ... you may just be creating more *Terrorists* :-D
   ---> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OO18F4aKGzQ&feature=dir

        Does Bin Laden know about America's good old days?

Despite paying lip service to "transformation" throughout the
1990s, America's armed forces failed to change in significant
ways after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In "The Sling
and the Stone," T.X. Hammes argues that the Defense Department's
transformation strategy focuses almost exclusively on high-
technology conventional wars. The doctrine, organizations,
equipment and training of the U.S. military confirm this
observation. The armed forces fought the global war on terrorism
for the first five years with a counterinsurgency doctrine last
revised in the Reagan administration. Despite engaging in
numerous stability operations throughout the 1990s, the armed
forces did little to bolster their capabilities for civic
reconstruction and security force development. Procurement
priorities during the 1990s followed the Cold War model, with
significant funding devoted to new fighter aircraft and
artillery systems. The most commonly used tactical scenarios in
both schools and training centers replicated high-intensity
interstate conflict. At the dawn of the 21st century, the U.S.
is fighting brutal, adaptive insurgencies in Afghanistan and
Iraq, while our armed forces have spent the preceding decade
having done little to prepare for such conflicts.

Having spent a decade preparing to fight the wrong war,
America's generals then miscalculated both the means and ways
necessary to succeed in Iraq. The most fundamental military
miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient
forces to provide security to Iraq's population. U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000
troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop
requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000
troops. Alone among America's generals, Army Chief of Staff
General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that "several hundred
thousand soldiers" would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam
Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field
commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many
senior general officers both active and retired expressed
serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq.
These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all
books such as "Fiasco" and "Cobra II." However, when the U.S.
went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to
win, these leaders did not make their objections public.

Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant
general could have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-
Saddam Iraq. However, inept planning for postwar Iraq took the
crisis caused by a lack of troops and quickly transformed it
into a debacle. In 1997, the U.S. Central Command exercise
"Desert Crossing" demonstrated that many postwar stabilization
tasks would fall to the military. The other branches of the U.S.
government lacked sufficient capability to do such work on the
scale required in Iraq. Despite these results, CENTCOM accepted
the assumption that the State Department would administer
postwar Iraq. The military never explained to the president the
magnitude of the challenges inherent in stabilizing postwar Iraq.

After failing to visualize the conditions of combat in Iraq,
America's generals failed to adapt to the demands of
counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency theory prescribes providing
continuous security to the population. However, for most of the
war American forces in Iraq have been concentrated on large
forward-operating bases, isolated from the Iraqi people and
focused on capturing or killing insurgents. Counterinsurgency
theory requires strengthening the capability of host-nation
institutions to provide security and other essential services to
the population. America's generals treated efforts to create
transition teams to develop local security forces and provincial
reconstruction teams to improve essential services as
afterthoughts, never providing the quantity or quality of
personnel necessary for success.

After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan
for postwar stabilization, America's general officer corps did
not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the
American public. The Iraq Study Group concluded that "there is
significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq." The ISG
noted that "on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or
significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of
the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of
violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is
systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy
with policy goals." Population security is the most important
measure of effectiveness in counterinsurgency. For more than
three years, America's generals continued to insist that the
U.S. was making progress in Iraq. However, for Iraqi civilians,
each year from 2003 onward was more deadly than the one
preceding it. For reasons that are not yet clear, America's
general officer corps underestimated the strength of the enemy,
overestimated the capabilities of Iraq's government and security
forces and failed to provide Congress with an accurate
assessment of security conditions in Iraq. Moreover, America's
generals have not explained clearly the larger strategic risks
of committing so large a portion of the nation's deployable land
power to a single theater of operations.

The intellectual and moral failures common to America's general
officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in
American generalship. Any explanation that fixes culpability on
individuals is insufficient. No one leader, civilian or
military, caused failure in Vietnam or Iraq. Different military
and civilian leaders in the two conflicts produced similar
results. In both conflicts, the general officer corps designed
to advise policymakers, prepare forces and conduct operations
failed to perform its intended functions. To understand how the
U.S. could face defeat at the hands of a weaker insurgent enemy
for the second time in a generation, we must look at the
structural influences that produce our general officer corps.

The Generals We Need

The most insightful examination of failed generalship comes from
J.F.C. Fuller's "Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure."
Fuller was a British major general who saw action in the first
attempts at armored warfare in World War I. He found three
common characteristics in great generals — courage, creative
intelligence and physical fitness.

The need for intelligent, creative and courageous general
officers is self-evident. An understanding of the larger aspects
of war is essential to great generalship. However, a survey of
Army three- and four-star generals shows that only 25 percent
hold advanced degrees from civilian institutions in the social
sciences or humanities. Counterinsurgency theory holds that
proficiency in foreign languages is essential to success, yet
only one in four of the Army's senior generals speaks another
language. While the physical courage of America's generals is
not in doubt, there is less certainty regarding their moral
courage. In almost surreal language, professional military men
blame their recent lack of candor on the intimidating management
style of their civilian masters. Now that the public is
immediately concerned with the crisis in Iraq, some of our
generals are finding their voices. They may have waited too long.

Neither the executive branch nor the services themselves are
likely to remedy the shortcomings in America's general officer
corps. Indeed, the tendency of the executive branch to seek out
mild-mannered team players to serve as senior generals is part
of the problem. The services themselves are equally to blame.
The system that produces our generals does little to reward
creativity and moral courage. Officers rise to flag rank by
following remarkably similar career patterns. Senior generals,
both active and retired, are the most important figures in
determining an officer's potential for flag rank. The views of
subordinates and peers play no role in an officer's advancement;
to move up he must only please his superiors. In a system in
which senior officers select for promotion those like
themselves, there are powerful incentives for conformity. It is
unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years
conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an
innovator in his late forties.

If America desires creative intelligence and moral courage in
its general officer corps, it must create a system that rewards
these qualities. Congress can create such incentives by
exercising its proper oversight function in three areas. First,
Congress must change the system for selecting general officers.
Second, oversight committees must apply increased scrutiny over
generating the necessary means and pursuing appropriate ways for
applying America's military power. Third, the Senate must hold
accountable through its confirmation powers those officers who
fail to achieve the aims of policy at an acceptable cost in
blood and treasure.

jack g.

        MIAMI (May 1, 2007) - In honor of Memorial Day, Carnival Cruise
Lines is launching a promotion throughout the month of May that allows
active and retired military personnel to book up to three "Fun Ship"
staterooms for themselves and their friends and family members at special
discounted rates.

        Reservations must be made between May 1-31, 2007, to qualify for
this promotion, which is available in conjunction with a variety of three-
to eight-day "Fun Ship" cruises departing May 1, 2007 to March 31, 2008,
from six convenient North American departure points.

        Rates start at $199 per person for three-day cruises from Miami and
Port Canaveral, Fla., and four-day cruises from Long Beach, Calif.; $249 for
five-day cruises from Mobile, Ala., and Jacksonville, Fla.; $379 per person
for six-day voyages from Fort Lauderdale, Fla.; $399 per person for
seven-day cruises from Miami; and $499 per person for eight-day cruises from
Fort Lauderdale.

        "Carnival is very pleased to offer this promotion which provides
active and retired military personnel an opportunity to enjoy a memorable
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our way of demonstrating our thanks and appreciation to these admirable men
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        The promotion is valid for individual bookings only, capacity
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        Carnival is the world's most popular cruise line, with a fleet of 22
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