>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>> On 28 Feb 2001 12:55:27 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>> wrote:

>>>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>>>> On 27 Feb 2001 17:06:01 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>>>> wrote:

>>>>>>"Keith Willshaw" (keith_wills...@compuserve.com) writes:

>>>>>>>> Well yes it is.  Land based air can carry heaver takeoff loads and can
>>>>>>>> have standing patrols over longer area.  A PBY can stay aloft for over
>>>>>>>> a day no carrier aircraft could do that.

>>>>>>> PBY's were great patrol aircraft but didnt carry much in the way of
>>>>>>> ordnance. The weapons most dangerous to a BB at this time
>>>>>>> were torpedoes. They were carried by LOTS of carrier aircraft

>>>>>>>> Likewise BB's had been used effectively to defend the ground troops on
>>>>>>>> Guadalcannal at night which was a mission no carrier would attempt. So
>>>>>>>> that the "useless" idea is really out of line.  If you want to argue
>>>>>>>> that Britain has sufficient BB's for her needs okay you can make that
>>>>>>>> argument.  However if you look at speed of the U.K.'s modern BB's and
>>>>>>>> the age of the fast BB's / BC's then you might see the need for a fast
>>>>>>>> battleship.

>>>>>>> There was only ONE action off Guadalcanal where
>>>>>>> US Battleships took part , the third battle of Savo Island.
>>>>>>> The other action were all Cruiser and destroyer actions
>>>>>>> in which the Allied forces didnt do too well

>>>>>>And, in which a battleship on the US side may have diminished the
>>>>>>losses, as well as inflicted more on the IJN.

>>>>> Want to check and see if any of the modern USN battleships were
>>>>> available for those actions?

>>>>Well then, that would suggest that there needed to be *more* fast
>>>>BBs in the inventory, and this is hardly a refutation of the
>>>>then percieved need for BBs.

>>> How does it suggest that?  We didn't have them available, and got by
>>> just fine without them.  Hiei was mission killed by cruisers and
>>> finished off by air power.

>>Having two cruisers sunk, three others badly damaged, both admirals
>>killed, and all but one DD damaged constitutes " got by just fine " ?

> Yes, got by just fine....because we won.

> Yep, because Mikawa failed in his mission to get the transports.
> Tactical loss, strategic victory, if you will.

>>>>Funny, Japan didn't think so. Their use of BBs, coupled with superior
>>>>training, which added to the utility of their BBs ( and, which is a
>>>>value added item with any weapon system ) gave them an unmatched superiority
>>>>in that sort of combat.

>>> The Japanese also were overconfident and knew we weren't experienced
>>> in night fighting.  They knew our torpedoes were nowhere near as good
>>> as theirs.

>>Since the USN was therefore concentrating on using it's gunpower, it
>>can follow that, under certain conditions, more gunpower, especially
>>when the other side brings BB gunpower, is a good thng to have. We
>>know what happened when the USN was deficient in both.

> We do?  Such as the Battle of Tassafaronga, where 4 USN cruisers were
> defeated by a Japanese destroyer force?

>>>>Indeed. And, the IJN was lucky that the USN failed to deploy adequate
>>>>gun firepower.

>>> The IJN was lucky?  Why do they call it *Ironbottom Sound*?  It ain't
>>> all US ships on the bottom........

>>Attrition warfare is not something that qualifies as good policy.

> The best laid plans o' mice and men........

> Rhetorical question?

>>>>>>> Fortunately Aircraft from Henderson Field and Enterprise
>>>>>>> destroyed most of the Japanese Troop transports

>>>>>>>> Just some thoughts for '43.

>>>>>>> By 1943 it was clear that the BB was obsolete.

>>>>>>I keep hearing this assertion, yet no one ever posts something
>>>>>>from the time that says this.

>>>>> I've made plenty of valid arguments why.  You can't accept it simply
>>>>> because I'm not a published author.

>>>>You've made valid arguments as to why it is seen that way NOW.
>>>>None of that is relevent to the matter of 1942-1945, and the
>>>>published record shows that.

>>>>As I've said, feel free to quote from some recognised sources on
>>>>the processes of the times. What anyone, you, me, anyone, believes
>>>>*now*, with the benefit of hindsight, does not answer that question.

>>> Andre, hindsight ain't got a thing to do with it.  I"m looking at what
>>> happened at the time, analysing the same information that they had
>>> available at that time.

>>Since you are doing that " analysing " in 2001, then hindsight has
>>*everything* to do with it. I asked you for cites from that time.

>>Your conclusions are coloured by your knowing the history of 1942-2001.
>>No one making decisions in 1942-1946 could have had access to any
>>such body of history. That will colour the " conclusions " made by
>>those in the later time period.

>>My point is simply that, at that time, this was not the sole conclusion
>>that could be reasonably reached.

> Andre, I'm looking at the same information that was available when the
> decisions were made.  Anything after that is irrelevant.

>>>>Beyond the rise of the carrier, which was by no means a decisisve
>>>>weapon, either in most of WW2, or since. Quick: name *one* decisive
>>>>use of carrier air power since. Korea had only one near-decisive
>>>>moment, and that was the introduction of Chinese forces, and Vietnam
>>>>too had only one decisive moment, which was the decision on the part of
>>>>the NV command to stay the course of the war. Even Desert Storm, where
>>>>everything went the Allies and their air forces way, had no such
>>>>moment pertaining to carrier air. Yet that doesn't reduce the
>>>>contribution that carriers make.

>>> You know why?  How many countries operating carriers since the end of
>>> the war have been involved in a naval conflict?  

>>So, carriers cannot make such contributions, in projecting power
>>inland ?

> Rhetorical question?

>>Granted.

>>> Carrier air power was used in Korea, Vietname, Desert Storm , Kosovo.

>>And in those, it helped, as did NGFS, but neither was decisive. Thus,
>>not proving that one system was " modern ", and the other " obsolete ".
>>At that time.

> So, if BBs weren't obsolete, why weren't anymore built after Vanguard?

>>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>>> On 28 Feb 2001 12:55:27 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>>> wrote:

>>>>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>>>>> On 27 Feb 2001 17:06:01 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>>>>> wrote:

>>>>>>>"Keith Willshaw" (keith_wills...@compuserve.com) writes:

>>>>>>>>> Well yes it is.  Land based air can carry heaver takeoff loads and can
>>>>>>>>> have standing patrols over longer area.  A PBY can stay aloft for over
>>>>>>>>> a day no carrier aircraft could do that.

>>>>>>>> PBY's were great patrol aircraft but didnt carry much in the way of
>>>>>>>> ordnance. The weapons most dangerous to a BB at this time
>>>>>>>> were torpedoes. They were carried by LOTS of carrier aircraft

>>>>>>>>> Likewise BB's had been used effectively to defend the ground troops on
>>>>>>>>> Guadalcannal at night which was a mission no carrier would attempt. So
>>>>>>>>> that the "useless" idea is really out of line.  If you want to argue
>>>>>>>>> that Britain has sufficient BB's for her needs okay you can make that
>>>>>>>>> argument.  However if you look at speed of the U.K.'s modern BB's and
>>>>>>>>> the age of the fast BB's / BC's then you might see the need for a fast
>>>>>>>>> battleship.

>>>>>>>> There was only ONE action off Guadalcanal where
>>>>>>>> US Battleships took part , the third battle of Savo Island.
>>>>>>>> The other action were all Cruiser and destroyer actions
>>>>>>>> in which the Allied forces didnt do too well

>>>>>>>And, in which a battleship on the US side may have diminished the
>>>>>>>losses, as well as inflicted more on the IJN.

>>>>>> Want to check and see if any of the modern USN battleships were
>>>>>> available for those actions?

>>>>>Well then, that would suggest that there needed to be *more* fast
>>>>>BBs in the inventory, and this is hardly a refutation of the
>>>>>then percieved need for BBs.

>>>> How does it suggest that?  We didn't have them available, and got by
>>>> just fine without them.  Hiei was mission killed by cruisers and
>>>> finished off by air power.

>>>Having two cruisers sunk, three others badly damaged, both admirals
>>>killed, and all but one DD damaged constitutes " got by just fine " ?

>> Yes, got by just fine....because we won.

>So then, since you won, then Pearl Harbor is a victory, Java Seas is
>a victory, and so on.

>Wait, lets go one better. Since the UK won WW2, the 1940 Battle of France
>was an Allied victory, as was the Invasion of Norway, the Invasion of
>Poland....

>Uh huh.

>> Yep, because Mikawa failed in his mission to get the transports.
>> Tactical loss, strategic victory, if you will.

>Nope, try US strategic filure to lose, which is not necessarily a
>win.

>>>>>Funny, Japan didn't think so. Their use of BBs, coupled with superior
>>>>>training, which added to the utility of their BBs ( and, which is a
>>>>>value added item with any weapon system ) gave them an unmatched superiority
>>>>>in that sort of combat.

>>>> The Japanese also were overconfident and knew we weren't experienced
>>>> in night fighting.  They knew our torpedoes were nowhere near as good
>>>> as theirs.

>>>Since the USN was therefore concentrating on using it's gunpower, it
>>>can follow that, under certain conditions, more gunpower, especially
>>>when the other side brings BB gunpower, is a good thng to have. We
>>>know what happened when the USN was deficient in both.

>> We do?  Such as the Battle of Tassafaronga, where 4 USN cruisers were
>> defeated by a Japanese destroyer force?

>Poor doctrine, and a failure to understand and learn from enemy
>night fighting skills, coupled with a poor choice as to how to
>fight the battle, didn't help.

>Admittedly, I would have not even taken a cruiser into that one,
>on the US side. So, I would also not have taken in a BB, either.

>> For a good portion of the Guadalcanal campaign only the old BBs were
>> available.

>At various times, three fast BBs were present. Even with damage
>( North Carolinas being torpedoed ), more use of them was possible.

>>>>>Indeed. And, the IJN was lucky that the USN failed to deploy adequate
>>>>>gun firepower.

>>>> The IJN was lucky?  Why do they call it *Ironbottom Sound*?  It ain't
>>>> all US ships on the bottom........

>>>Attrition warfare is not something that qualifies as good policy.

>> The best laid plans o' mice and men........

>No, the least laid plans, coupled with having more materiel.

>> Rhetorical question?

>Nope.

>>>>>>>> The critical weakness of the USN at the Solomons was the
>>>>>>>> inferiority of their torpedoes and poor night fighting skills

>>>>>>>> Fortunately Aircraft from Henderson Field and Enterprise
>>>>>>>> destroyed most of the Japanese Troop transports

>>>>>>>>> Just some thoughts for '43.

>>>>>>>> By 1943 it was clear that the BB was obsolete.

>>>>>>>I keep hearing this assertion, yet no one ever posts something
>>>>>>>from the time that says this.

>>>>>> I've made plenty of valid arguments why.  You can't accept it simply
>>>>>> because I'm not a published author.

>>>>>You've made valid arguments as to why it is seen that way NOW.
>>>>>None of that is relevent to the matter of 1942-1945, and the
>>>>>published record shows that.

>>>>>As I've said, feel free to quote from some recognised sources on
>>>>>the processes of the times. What anyone, you, me, anyone, believes
>>>>>*now*, with the benefit of hindsight, does not answer that question.

>>>> Andre, hindsight ain't got a thing to do with it.  I"m looking at what
>>>> happened at the time, analysing the same information that they had
>>>> available at that time.

>>>Since you are doing that " analysing " in 2001, then hindsight has
>>>*everything* to do with it. I asked you for cites from that time.

>>>Your conclusions are coloured by your knowing the history of 1942-2001.
>>>No one making decisions in 1942-1946 could have had access to any
>>>such body of history. That will colour the " conclusions " made by
>>>those in the later time period.

>>>My point is simply that, at that time, this was not the sole conclusion
>>>that could be reasonably reached.

>> Andre, I'm looking at the same information that was available when the
>> decisions were made.  Anything after that is irrelevant.

>I'll say it again: " It is up to you to prove your own case. Making a
>flat, *unsupported* statement and then challenging everyone else in the
>world to assume the burden of proof is not the way things are done ".

>> Your dependence on cites must be laborious.  I choose to analyze
>> information and draw forth my own logical conclusion.

>And, deny materials that you do not like. How very scholarly.

>Oh, baloney. If you have case, a valid one, then you certainly have
>some factual basis upon which to hang that case on. Otherwise, you're
>in cloud cuckoo land.

>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>> On 27 Feb 2001 16:29:21 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>> wrote:

>>>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>>>> On 22 Feb 2001 23:28:46 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>>>> wrote:

>>>>>> (ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk) writes:
>>>>>>> In article <3a9156a4.20619...@news.exis.net>, pau...@exis.net (Paul
>>>>>>> Holloway) wrote:

>>>>>>>> Get rid of the BBs, use the savings for newer carriers.  

>>>>>>>  They did the only BB that survive were the KGV class and Vanguard.
>>>>>>> As I and others have pointed out it would have cost more to scrap
>>>>>>> Vanguard than complete her. By the way the French, USSR, Brazil,
>>>>>>> Turkey, Argentina and Chile had BB or BC until the late fifties.

>>>>>>And the US, right ? <g>

>>>>> Yep.  Didn't really need them though.

>>>>Well, they didn't think that, *at the time*.

>>> The battleship admirals wouldn't have dared let them go.

>>Really ? Got even ONE cite for this claim ?

> IMHO, the battleship admirals wouldn't have dared let them go.  

>>>>>>More or less, with weapons in great flux at the time.

>>>>> Became obsolescent during WWII, obsolete by post war.

>>>>> Obsolete:  Outmoded in design, style, or construction.

>>>>> It was clearly outmoded in design and style considering that cruisers
>>>>> could fulfill the same roles at less cost and manpower expense.

>>>>As I've repeatedly said, this was not so cut and dried, as of 1945.
>>>>Hindsight can be 20/20.

>>> Sure it was.  As of 1945 the carrier had more than proven itself.  The
>>> battleship had proven to be too large, expensive, and manpower
>>> intensive to operate when she no longer had the role of destroying
>>> another countries capital ships.  Cruisers were obviously the best
>>> choice.

>>As I keep saying... read the books...

> Yes, and plenty of the books say the exact same thing.  The USN
> discovered after the night actions off of Guadalcanal that cruisers
> were better suited for that type of action.  

>>For the same reasons that such ships have always been built in greater
>>numbers then the capital ships, all the way back to before Nelson's
>>time ( when, BTW, there were no carriers ).

>>You mean, how many were built of those programmes. Which have to
>>account for many other needs, too, and a limited amount of building
>>space.

> And the answer is?

>>Which suggests that there was a need for such a ship. Thank you for
>>making *my* point.

> Suggests nothing of the sort.  The RN felt like they needed a fast
> battleship as a carrier escort for Far Eastern opeartions.  They
> already had the 4 turrets.  

>>>>Actually, not fully. And, by now, there is no " ship of the line "
>>>>role.

>>> Metaphorically speaking.

>>*Operationally* speaking.

> Then why are USN task forces built around CVs?  Ever heard of a CVBG?

>>>>The professionals of the time seem to disagree with you.

>>> According to some of your sources, some felt that a BB or 2 was still
>>> needed.

>>That surely qualifies as their disagreeing with your sweeping claim
>>that the BB was " obsolete ". My point.

> Just because some of the admirals wanted to keep them around doesn't
> mean that it was a good idea.  You keep missing that point.

>>Because there was no percieved need for more ships, when ten were in
>>service. However, with the RN only having four such ships, adding a
>>cheap and almost finished fifth one was a reasonable decision. At the time.

> But if the battleship wasn't obsolete, if it was still a viable,
> important part of the fleet, then why don't you build more?

>>Nope. Feel free to cite something that supports such a sweeping claim.

> I'm tiring of this.   Anybody can see that.  If I find a cite, I will
> surely post it for you.

>>Fine. So, that the USN all but ceased to buy *any* new hardware, suggests
>>that all such hardware was " obsolete ", by your argument.

> *sigh* Interpret it any way you like..........

> Paul Holloway

>>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>>> On 27 Feb 2001 16:29:21 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>>> wrote:

>>>>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>>>>> On 22 Feb 2001 23:28:46 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>>>>> wrote:

>>>>>>> (ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk) writes:
>>>>>>>> In article <3a9156a4.20619...@news.exis.net>, pau...@exis.net (Paul
>>>>>>>> Holloway) wrote:

>>>>>>>>> Get rid of the BBs, use the savings for newer carriers.  

>>>>>>>>  They did the only BB that survive were the KGV class and Vanguard.
>>>>>>>> As I and others have pointed out it would have cost more to scrap
>>>>>>>> Vanguard than complete her. By the way the French, USSR, Brazil,
>>>>>>>> Turkey, Argentina and Chile had BB or BC until the late fifties.

>>>>>>>And the US, right ? <g>

>>>>>> Yep.  Didn't really need them though.

>>>>>Well, they didn't think that, *at the time*.

>>>> The battleship admirals wouldn't have dared let them go.

>>>Really ? Got even ONE cite for this claim ?

>> IMHO, the battleship admirals wouldn't have dared let them go.  

>Not the point. Your *opinion*, without any backing, is not sufficient.

>And, are you going to show, with cites, how these Admirals were
>the ones who had the power to do that, in spite of supposed
>evidence to the contrary of their positions ?

>That the BB guys viewed the others as something, doesn't address the
>question of, were these the guys who made the policy, and did these
>guys let their prejudices sway their choices ? You've offered
>*nothing* to show either.

>>>>>>>More or less, with weapons in great flux at the time.

>>>>>> Became obsolescent during WWII, obsolete by post war.

>>>>>> Obsolete:  Outmoded in design, style, or construction.

>>>>>> It was clearly outmoded in design and style considering that cruisers
>>>>>> could fulfill the same roles at less cost and manpower expense.

>>>>>As I've repeatedly said, this was not so cut and dried, as of 1945.
>>>>>Hindsight can be 20/20.

>>>> Sure it was.  As of 1945 the carrier had more than proven itself.  The
>>>> battleship had proven to be too large, expensive, and manpower
>>>> intensive to operate when she no longer had the role of destroying
>>>> another countries capital ships.  Cruisers were obviously the best
>>>> choice.

>>>As I keep saying... read the books...

>> Yes, and plenty of the books say the exact same thing.  The USN
>> discovered after the night actions off of Guadalcanal that cruisers
>> were better suited for that type of action.  

>One action type, one place. However, this doctrine would have been
>most inappropriate at North Cape.

>Oh, so you use *much* more general books then I do. It figures.

>I've read his stuff. Its mostly coffee table materials for the layman.
>I find it grossly shallow.

>>>For the same reasons that such ships have always been built in greater
>>>numbers then the capital ships, all the way back to before Nelson's
>>>time ( when, BTW, there were no carriers ).

>Hmm... Nothing to answer this one, either...

>>>You mean, how many were built of those programmes. Which have to
>>>account for many other needs, too, and a limited amount of building
>>>space.

>> And the answer is?

>As a geologist would tell you, the key to any observation is *context*.
>You continue to fail to note that.

>>>Which suggests that there was a need for such a ship. Thank you for
>>>making *my* point.

>> Suggests nothing of the sort.  The RN felt like they needed a fast
>> battleship as a carrier escort for Far Eastern opeartions.  They
>> already had the 4 turrets.  

>So then, building her was a reasonable choice. Thank you for making
>my point.

>So you say. The pros do not.

>>>>>Actually, not fully. And, by now, there is no " ship of the line "
>>>>>role.

>>>> Metaphorically speaking.

>>>*Operationally* speaking.

>> Then why are USN task forces built around CVs?  Ever heard of a CVBG?

>This is 2001. *that* was 1945. Sheesh.

>>>>>The professionals of the time seem to disagree with you.

>>>> According to some of your sources, some felt that a BB or 2 was still
>>>> needed.

>>>That surely qualifies as their disagreeing with your sweeping claim
>>>that the BB was " obsolete ". My point.

>> Just because some of the admirals wanted to keep them around doesn't
>> mean that it was a good idea.  You keep missing that point.

>You keep missing the point that those admirals don't get to make
>all of the policy. Unless you have some... *proof* to the contrary ?

>>>Because there was no percieved need for more ships, when ten were in
>>>service. However, with the RN only having four such ships, adding a
>>>cheap and almost finished fifth one was a reasonable decision. At the time.

>> But if the battleship wasn't obsolete, if it was still a viable,
>> important part of the fleet, then why don't you build more?

>For the same reason that the USN didn't build more CAs. They had
>enough to operate.

>>>Nope. Feel free to cite something that supports such a sweeping claim.

>> I'm tiring of this.   Anybody can see that.  If I find a cite, I will
>> surely post it for you.

>I note that " if "...

>No, its not. This is your assertion. Show your proofs.

>>>Fine. So, that the USN all but ceased to buy *any* new hardware, suggests
>>>that all such hardware was " obsolete ", by your argument.

>> *sigh* Interpret it any way you like..........

>I'm only using *your stated criteria*. If it is deficient, that is not
>my responsibility. *you* came up with it.

> (snip)
>>>>>>> Then, of course, the massive Soviet cruiser threat.

>>>>>>> Apparently UK and USN intel was so bad that they had no idea about
>>>>>>> anything concerning Soviet heavy units.  I find that a bit hard to
>>>>>>> believe........surely they already had specs on the Kirovs (given that
>>>>>>> they were pre-war cruisers).

>>>>>>This is a statement of absolutes. The real question, was there enough
>>>>>>intel about the *right* things ( leaving aside such national security
>>>>>>matters as nukes... ) naval, *is*.

>>>>> The question is simple.  Did they or did they not have the specs for
>>>>> the Kirovs?

>>>>Who cares ? The percieved threat was from the Sverdlovs, as I have
>>>>posted. As the Kirovs were not a cause of such concern, this is not
>>>>relevant.

>>> Yet the Sverdlovs weren't much better platforms than the
>>> Kirovs........

>>In the eyes of those making the decisions back then, they seemed
>>to be, as there was apparently little concern over the short legged
>>Kirovs, which were also nearly 50 % smaller ( 8177 v/ 16,000 tons
>>standard displacement ) then a Sverdlov.

> But they didn't know how big the Sverdlovs were, right?

>>>>>>> Oh, and I just thought of something..............if the RN was so damn
>>>>>>> scared of a Soviet naval threat, why didn't they demand the Royal
>>>>>>> Sovereign be returned to them, and why in the hell did they agree to
>>>>>>> handing over an Italian BB?

>>>>>>> Andre, that ain't hindsight, and it doesn't take a genius to see that
>>>>>>> allowing Russia to keep the RS as long as they did (til 49?)  and
>>>>>>> handing over an Italian BB totally contradicts the bulk of your cites.

>>>>>>Nope. What it does show, is that the higher level of international
>>>>>>politics can, and often does, make problems for the operators of ships,
>>>>>>and other war toys.

>>>>>>The Admiralty did *not* have a veto about this question. But, they did
>>>>>>have to deal with it.

>>>>No answer to this, either...

>>> Then the politicians and the Admiralty were both stupid.

>>Name calling is not a substitute for an actual argument.

> Just stating the facts, sir.

>>>>>>Right. Given the age, condition, and particulars of RS, the RN
>>>>>>did not see her under a Soviet flag as a threat to them.

>>>>Or this...

>>> They didn't?  Why not?  She's old and slow, but clearly much better
>>> armed and armoured than the Sverdlovs.

>>Not at all. Surely not better armed, with short ranged and old guns
>>( BTW, the Vanguard's 15 inchers had all the updates, including
>>increase in elevation that RS lacked ), and her lack of speed was
>>a fatal flaw, were she to be used against a fast western force.

> Huh?  You're saying the RS wasn't better armed, in terms of
> anti-surface armament, than a Sverdlov?  8 15" versus 12 5.9", and
> more than twice the armor?

>>>>>>Because that was NOT a decision that the Admiralty had control over,
>>>>>>and that the national command authorities had other matters concerning
>>>>>>those hand overs on their plates.

>>>>>>Plus, you are in error about 2. One was handed over, when the other
>>>>>>was returned. Thus, at any time, there was only one to deal with

>>>>> Sorry, I forgot to check the dates, I thought the Italian BB
>>>>> (Ceasear??) was handed over in '47.

>>>>Another elementary error on your part, one that would have been
>>>>easily verifyable by using a publishd reference book, such as
>>>>Conways. Which states that the Giulio Cesare was handed over to
>>>>Soviet control on December 15, 1948, and that the Royal Sovereign
>>>>was thus handed back to RN control on February 4, 1949.

>>> Andre, you're really starting to be a pissant.

>>I can see that you become disturbed emotionally, when you are caught
>>in an error, and you don't want to admit that fact.

> See, there you go again.  After you pointed it out to me, I freely
> admitted that I forgot to check the date.  I freely admitted to the
> error.  I wasn't *caught*, I made an honest mistake.

>>Then, don't make claims that you cannot back up. In any case, I
>>only needed the books for the *exact* dates. I already knew that
>>the two ships were not in Soviet service at the same time.

> I was making a claim based on my memory, which does fail me at times.
> You pointed out the error, and I admitted to it.  What else do you
> frickin' want?

> You just got to drag it out, don't you?

>>It was an elementary error on your part. You made a claim without
>>knowing it, or checking it. What else would a prof call that ?

> Ummm, a mistake?  

>>>>>>> Now try and tell me the Admiralty at the time was making some
>>>>>>> seriously mistaken decisions based on the state of things *at that
>>>>>>> time*.  This ain't a matter of hindsight whatsoever.

>>>>>>Right. It s a matter of *politics*, which took place at higher pay
>>>>>>grades then the Admiralty.

>>>>> Speaking of politics..........the decision to finish Vanguard, like
>>>>> the decision to hand over RS, and hand over an Italian BB to the
>>>>> Soviets, was political just as well.

>>>>You're partly correct. The choice to build Vanguard was unquestioningly
>>>>a choice that had a political component. As do any such choices to
>>>>build major national assets. Beyond that, none of the materials
>>>>that I have read and cited, make any claim that the choice to complete
>>>>her, at a stage when she was seven *months* from completion, had any
>>>>sort of political portion to it, and you have not cited *any* source
>>>>to make your case. Assertions are not sufficient. *Proof* IS.

>>> You actually believe that the decision to finish her wasn't political?

>>You appear to be claiming that it was *solely* political. I disagree,
>>for reasons that I have already stated. And, I might add, that the
>>building of any such national asset is always political. In that
>>the choice to allocate national asets is a political decision, as well
>>as being a military one, too.

> Well, appearances can be decieving.   I'm not making the claim that it
> was *solely* political.

>>Now I'm being *too* well informed ? That is

>>>> Yet the Sverdlovs weren't much better platforms than the
>>>> Kirovs........

>>>In the eyes of those making the decisions back then, they seemed
>>>to be, as there was apparently little concern over the short legged
>>>Kirovs, which were also nearly 50 % smaller ( 8177 v/ 16,000 tons
>>>standard displacement ) then a Sverdlov.

>> But they didn't know how big the Sverdlovs were, right?

>They did know that they were bigger. Thats one reason they saw them as
>a threat.

>>>>>>>> Oh, and I just thought of something..............if the RN was so damn
>>>>>>>> scared of a Soviet naval threat, why didn't they demand the Royal
>>>>>>>> Sovereign be returned to them, and why in the hell did they agree to
>>>>>>>> handing over an Italian BB?

>>>>>>>> Andre, that ain't hindsight, and it doesn't take a genius to see that
>>>>>>>> allowing Russia to keep the RS as long as they did (til 49?)  and
>>>>>>>> handing over an Italian BB totally contradicts the bulk of your cites.

>>>>>>>Nope. What it does show, is that the higher level of international
>>>>>>>politics can, and often does, make problems for the operators of ships,
>>>>>>>and other war toys.

>>>>>>>The Admiralty did *not* have a veto about this question. But, they did
>>>>>>>have to deal with it.

>>>>>No answer to this, either...

>>>> Then the politicians and the Admiralty were both stupid.

>>>Name calling is not a substitute for an actual argument.

>> Just stating the facts, sir.

>Nope. Its not a " fact ", just 'cause it makes you feel all warm and
>fuzzy. Its a fact, *if you can back it up with some actual research*.
>Until then, its just laziness and insolence.

>>>>>>>Right. Given the age, condition, and particulars of RS, the RN
>>>>>>>did not see her under a Soviet flag as a threat to them.

>>>>>Or this...

>>>> They didn't?  Why not?  She's old and slow, but clearly much better
>>>> armed and armoured than the Sverdlovs.

>>>Not at all. Surely not better armed, with short ranged and old guns
>>>( BTW, the Vanguard's 15 inchers had all the updates, including
>>>increase in elevation that RS lacked ), and her lack of speed was
>>>a fatal flaw, were she to be used against a fast western force.

>> Huh?  You're saying the RS wasn't better armed, in terms of
>> anti-surface armament, than a Sverdlov?  8 15" versus 12 5.9", and
>> more than twice the armor?

>Come on, you're surely not that dim. A fast ship could evade chase,
>a slow one cannot. You seemed to be clear enough about that, when
>talking about USN slow BBs.

>>>>>>>Because that was NOT a decision that the Admiralty had control over,
>>>>>>>and that the national command authorities had other matters concerning
>>>>>>>those hand overs on their plates.

>>>>>>>Plus, you are in error about 2. One was handed over, when the other
>>>>>>>was returned. Thus, at any time, there was only one to deal with

>>>>>> Sorry, I forgot to check the dates, I thought the Italian BB
>>>>>> (Ceasear??) was handed over in '47.

>>>>>Another elementary error on your part, one that would have been
>>>>>easily verifyable by using a publishd reference book, such as
>>>>>Conways. Which states that the Giulio Cesare was handed over to
>>>>>Soviet control on December 15, 1948, and that the Royal Sovereign
>>>>>was thus handed back to RN control on February 4, 1949.

>>>> Andre, you're really starting to be a pissant.

>>>I can see that you become disturbed emotionally, when you are caught
>>>in an error, and you don't want to admit that fact.

>> See, there you go again.  After you pointed it out to me, I freely
>> admitted that I forgot to check the date.  I freely admitted to the
>> error.  I wasn't *caught*, I made an honest mistake.

>In other words, you made a factual assertion without checking your
>facts, and got caught with your panys down. Yet, you claim that I
>ought to take your word on the rest, with that track record ?
>Nope.

>Yep. 'Cause I won't accept such sweeping statements without some form
>of proof. Of which none has yet been offered. By anyone other then myself.

>> I used to enjoy our discourses, but now you're really starting to be
>> an asshole about things, and there's no sense in it.

>Ah, more ad hominum. The last refuge of someone without anything else.

>>>Then, don't make claims that you cannot back up. In any case, I
>>>only needed the books for the *exact* dates. I already knew that
>>>the two ships were not in Soviet service at the same time.

>> I was making a claim based on my memory, which does fail me at times.
>> You pointed out the error, and I admitted to it.  What else do you
>> frickin' want?

>How about your understanding that this may not be the only time that
>your memory failed you, at least in this argument ? That you might
>find some use in citing *facts* if you want me to buy your point of view,
>when you make howlers such as that one was.

>Annoying to be caught out, isn't it ?

>> You just got to drag it out, don't you?

>Me ?

>As could be your analysis of them, too.

>That is a point of being here, yes ?

>>>> It's not as if I didn't look it up, and then said I was right.  I
>>>> freely admitted I made a mistake.   I can do without the patronizing
>>>> remarks, ok?

>>>It was an elementary error on your part. You made a claim without
>>>knowing it, or checking it. What else would a prof call that ?

>> Ummm, a mistake?  

>One that surely didn't help your thesis, either.

>I learn my materials before I present them.

>So high school.

>>>You appear to be claiming that it was *solely* political. I disagree,
>>>for reasons that I have already stated. And, I might add, that the
>>>building of any such national asset is always political. In that
>>>the choice to allocate national asets is a political decision, as well
>>>as being a military one, too.

>> Well, appearances can be decieving.   I'm not making the claim that it
>> was *solely* political.

>Fine. Then, according to my sources, some of which I posted, you're
>quite wrong. Feel free to cite anything that makes your case. If you
>have anything, that is...

>>>Now I'm being *too* well informed ? That is bad, how ?

>> Why is it you misconstrue everything?

>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>> On 27 Feb 2001 16:26:07 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>> wrote:

>>>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>>>> On 22 Feb 2001 23:55:47 GMT, dg...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Andre Lieven)
>>>>> wrote:

>>>>>>Paul Holloway (pau...@exis.net) writes:
>>>>>>> On 22 Feb 2001 04:27:08 GMT, ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk wrote:

>>>>>>>>In article <3a9156a4.20619...@news.exis.net>, pau...@exis.net (Paul
>>>>>>>>Holloway) wrote:

>>>>>>>>> Get rid of the BBs, use the savings for newer carriers.  
>>>>>>>> They did the only BB that survive were the KGV class and Vanguard. As
>>>>>>>>I and others have pointed out it would have cost more to scrap
>>>>>>>>Vanguard than complete her. By the way the French, USSR, Brazil,
>>>>>>>>Turkey, Argentina and Chile had BB or BC until the late fifties.
>>>>>>>>Immediately post war the BB was not seen as obsolete. It might be
>>>>>>>>obsolescent.

>>>>>>>>Ken Young

>>>>>>> The French had almost no fleet to speak of whatsoever and simply
>>>>>>> needed hulls in commission.  The USSR operated an ex-British and an
>>>>>>> ex-Italian ship which they didn't pay for nor build on their own.  The
>>>>>>> other countries you mention already had old ships that were built well
>>>>>>> before carrier avaition became ruler of the seas.  Plus, those
>>>>>>> countries really had no practical enemy to speak of.

>>>>>>> The savings should have been used on newer carriers, rebuilding the
>>>>>>> old ones, and funding the FAA in order to provide modern, competent
>>>>>>> air groups.  

>>>>>>Peter, as I've pointed out more then once, there were *no* " savings "
>>>>>>to be had there. The ship was built and paid for, and not finishing
>>>>>>her would have, at least entailed cancellation penalties and costs,
>>>>>>along with the costs of either laying her up ( as with HMS Leviathan )
>>>>>>or scrapping her. The costs to maintain and run her were a pittance
>>>>>>compared to the burgening costs of new acquisitions of ships and
>>>>>>planes, which is why the RN got precious few of either through
>>>>>>the time period in question.

>>>>>>As I've said, the books that cover this can tell you, in great detail,
>>>>>>why your assertion of " savings " is simply *not true*.

>>>>> You're saying that no money would have been saved throughout the
>>>>> entirety of Vanguards commission?

>>>>That is a question of no relevenace. " No " money is asked, in an
>>>>attempt to show that " some " would have been saved. You know that.
>>>>Say you have a car, and today, you do not drive it. You have " saved "
>>>>a couple of gallon's worth of costs. What can you buy with that
>>>>savings ? Anything that would make up for the monies that you are
>>>>and have paid for that car, from purchase, to maintentance and
>>>>insurance ?

>>> That was part of my point, thank you.

>>Your " point " was that, the RN would gain such a savings from not
>>operating Vanguard ( a fully just paid for major asset ) that that
>>was going to re-equip the FAA/NA with scads of new and powerful
>>strike aircraft and the modern and large carriers to operate them from,
>>all from that about 1,000,000 pounds a year ?

>>Really ? Thats your point ? Amazing !

> My point was that they would have saved money that could have been
> better used.  Simple as that.

>>>>I have previously posted the actual costs.

>>> Why not keep Anson or Howe?  

>>Since a better ship was available, *that* would have been " silly ".

> Better to finish an uncomplete ship than keep 2 ships that are already
> completed?    Hmmmm...............

>>>>>>??? Had the RN had to do a Corporate at a time when Eagle and Ark Royal
>>>>>>were in service, it would have been over, and far faster for the RN.

>>>>> Actually, it was well illustrated in Korea and Suez.

>>>>Wrong, as there was no naval other side in either of those cases.

>>> What does that have to do with it?  Given that the RN had no airbases
>>> within range, then carrier airpower was important in both instances,
>>> whether or not there was an opposing navy.

>>Important and useful, sure. Decisive, no. Also, the sole needed
>>weapon, no.

> Oh, the Suez debacle had a lot to do with the lack of available
> airpower.

>>And yet, after 42 days and nights of bombing, the Iraqi ground forces
>>were still in Kuwait. Four days of ground fighting later, they were
>>*not*. Which was decisive, and which was a useful adjunct, but *not*
>>decisive ?

> What made it possible for the ground forces to achieve such an
> overwhelming, decisive victory in such little time with so few
> casualties?

>>>>Because the RN needed her in home or Med waters.

>>> Why is that?  For what?  

>>Oh futz, READ THE BOOKS....

> Mail them to me and I'll be happy to.

>>Wrong, again. Read the books.

>>>>Why didn't a Midway serve in Korea ? Does that same lack of service
>>>>" prove " that the Midways were " silly " ? Nope. In *both* cases.

>>> Hey, you were the one claiming various uses for the Vanguard.  I was
>>> asking why she wasn't used when a prime opportunity arose.

>>And I answered that question, and offered you another example of
>>another weapons system that was also not so used. Korea wasn't
>>the only matter on the RN's plate.

>>> I'll have to look it up, but Midway was proabably operating with
>>> LANTFLT.  We did have NATO committments, and given that the bulk of
>>> the USN was operating off of Korea..........

>>Umm... You did notice that I said " A " Midway. You know, including
>>the FDR and the Coral Sea. Surely one could have been sent of the three,
>>if you're going to pick at the RN for not sending the *one* Vanguard,
>>which was also needed in the Atlantic.

>>Why do you question the percieved need for the *one* Vanguard there,
>>but not the *three* Midways ?

> I never said the Midways weren't needed.

> You're applying it incorrectly, but that's ok.

> Paul Holloway

>>>> That was part of my point, thank you.

>>>Your " point " was that, the RN would gain such a savings from not
>>>operating Vanguard ( a fully just paid for major asset ) that that
>>>was going to re-equip the FAA/NA with scads of new and powerful
>>>strike aircraft and the modern and large carriers to operate them from,
>>>all from that about 1,000,000 pounds a year ?

>>>Really ? Thats your point ? Amazing !

>> My point was that they would have saved money that could have been
>> better used.  Simple as that.

>Since the costs were about a million pounds a year, what could the RN
>have bought that would have been *better* with that specific sum ?

>>>>>I have previously posted the actual costs.

>>>> Why not keep Anson or Howe?  

>>>Since a better ship was available, *that* would have been " silly ".

>> Better to finish an uncomplete ship than keep 2 ships that are already
>> completed?    Hmmmm...............

>" Or " means one or the other. Make up your mind. Neither KGV was half
>the annual running cost of the Vanguard. And, since they were kept,
>in reserve, your point is... ?

>>>>>>>??? Had the RN had to do a Corporate at a time when Eagle and Ark Royal
>>>>>>>were in service, it would have been over, and far faster for the RN.

>>>>>> Actually, it was well illustrated in Korea and Suez.

>>>>>Wrong, as there was no naval other side in either of those cases.

>>>> What does that have to do with it?  Given that the RN had no airbases
>>>> within range, then carrier airpower was important in both instances,
>>>> whether or not there was an opposing navy.

>>>Important and useful, sure. Decisive, no. Also, the sole needed
>>>weapon, no.

>> Oh, the Suez debacle had a lot to do with the lack of available
>> airpower.

>Which the carriers were not able to fully replace, evem with *five*
>fixed wing ships, plus two support helo ships. So much for the
>sweeping power of the 50s carriers...

>>>And yet, after 42 days and nights of bombing, the Iraqi ground forces
>>>were still in Kuwait. Four days of ground fighting later, they were
>>>*not*. Which was decisive, and which was a useful adjunct, but *not*
>>>decisive ?

>> What made it possible for the ground forces to achieve such an
>> overwhelming, decisive victory in such little time with so few
>> casualties?

>Many things, starting with Sea Power...

>> BTW, never made any claims using the word "decisive".

>Then, whats the point of concentrating all resources in a non-
>decisive system ?

>>>>>Because the RN needed her in home or Med waters.

>>>> Why is that?  For what?  

>>>Oh futz, READ THE BOOKS....

>> Mail them to me and I'll be happy to.

>Its not my job to pay for your ignorance. Go to a library.

>>>Wrong, again. Read the books.

>>>>>Why didn't a Midway serve in Korea ? Does that same lack of service
>>>>>" prove " that the Midways were " silly " ? Nope. In *both* cases.

>>>> Hey, you were the one claiming various uses for the Vanguard.  I was
>>>> asking why she wasn't used when a prime opportunity arose.

>>>And I answered that question, and offered you another example of
>>>another weapons system that was also not so used. Korea wasn't
>>>the only matter on the RN's plate.

>>>> I'll have to look it up, but Midway was proabably operating with
>>>> LANTFLT.  We did have NATO committments, and given that the bulk of
>>>> the USN was operating off of Korea..........

>>>Umm... You did notice that I said " A " Midway. You know, including
>>>the FDR and the Coral Sea. Surely one could have been sent of the three,
>>>if you're going to pick at the RN for not sending the *one* Vanguard,
>>>which was also needed in the Atlantic.

>>>Why do you question the percieved need for the *one* Vanguard there,
>>>but not the *three* Midways ?

>> I never said the Midways weren't needed.

>They sure didn't serve in Korea, either. By *your* criteria, that
>also made them " obsolete ".

>Funny, you brought in other systems when it served your wishes...

>> You're applying it incorrectly, but that's ok.

>Fine. Show us all how I got that " wrong ". The world wonders...

> On Tue, 27 Feb 2001, CDR. Spock wrote:

> > In article <97b2qm$gj...@sshuraac-i-1.production.compuserve.com>,
> > keith_wills...@compuserve.com says...

> > > You are missing the simple fact that Cariers were typically
> > > 5 knots faster than Battleships and could launch a strike
> > > from over a hundred miles away. Now if the carrier is dumb enough
> > > to drop anchor and wait I suppose the BB MIGHT  catch him

> > At one hundered miles if I sail the BB at you at 25 nots and you sail at
> > me at 35 knot because you _have to_ to launcht your planes into the wind
> > the closing speed is 60 knots........

> > How long does it take to "catch up"?

> Well, let's see.

> 30 minutes at 35 kts to launch the strike.  Distance 70 miles.

> 1 hour retiring at 35 kts to refuel and rearm.   Distance 70 miles.

> 30 minutes into the wind to recover the 2nd strike.  Distance 30 miles.

> 1 hour retiring to refuel and rearm.   Distance 40 miles.

> You're still 40 miles away and I've got a -third- strike on the deck and
> ready to go.  Plus, I doubt if your speed is 25 kts any more after taking
> two airstrikes.  Mine is still 35 and I can strike again or run away as
> the situation dictates.

> In this scenario, i like the odds on the carrier a whole bunch better.

> Cheers and all,