Jokes apart, I reproduce an excerp about the incident from 'Modern Naval
Combat' (David and Chris Miller, Crescent Books, 1986):
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
[...]
The [British] Task Force arrived in the vecinity of the Falklands in three
separate groups, entering the Maritime Exclusion Zone ---the area 200nm from
the centre of the Falklands in wich Britain had declared all Argentinian
ships would be attacked after April 12--- at 01.30 on May 1, 1982. The first
group, Task Unit 317.8.2, composed of Brilliant, Sheffield, Glasgow,
Coventry, Arrow and the tanker Pearleaf, had been despatched ahead of the
main force in order to establish a presence as far south as possible, in
case diplomatic moves imposed a freeze on military units in the Falklands
area. The second group, Task Unit 319.9 (Antrim, Plymouth and the supply
ships Tidespring and Fort Austin), had been sent to repossess South Georgia,
a plan known as Operation Paraquet. The third and final part was the main
battle group wich initially consisted of the aircraft carriers Hermes and
Invincible, with their 20 Sea Harrier aircraft, the destroyer Glamorgan and
the frigates Broadsword, Yarmouth and Alacrity; the supply ships Olmeda and
Resource were in support and the Battle Group was designated Task Group
317.8.

The Argentinian Navy had three groups at sea and in their preplanned
positions by April 20, two days before the British arrived. The aircraft
carrier group TG 79.1 and 79.2, commanded by Rear Admiral Allara aboard the
Veinticinco de Mayo, escorted by the destroyers Santisima Trinidad and
Hercules, was stationed to the northwest of the islands. A second group, TG
79.4, composed of the frigates Drummond, Guerrico and Granville, lay some
150mn to the west of the Argentinian strike force. To the south of the
Falklands was TG 79.3, composed of the Exocet cruiser Belgrano and two
former US Sumner class destroyers.

By May 2 the Argentinian carrier groups were in position to launch an attack
on the British. On the previous evening one of the Veinticinco de Mayo's
reconnaissance aircraft had located the British group some 300 miles to the
southeast of the Argentinian ships, wich therefore closed during the night
until they were approximately 120mn away, and just before dawn the carrier's
A-4Q Skyhawks were ordered to a maximum state of deck readiness, fully
fuelled and loaded with 500lb bombs, while the crews sat waiting in their
confined cockpits.

The British had three SSNs in the area, Spartan and Splendid to the north
and Conqueror to the south, but although Spartan had located the frigate
group TG 79.4 on April 29 neither submarine could find the carrier. It was a
Sea Harrier flying a routine night Combat Air Patrol (CAP) that first
detected the approaching threat. The British Task Force turned away, anxious
to put as much distance as possible between themselves and the Argentinians,
and numerous Harrier patrols were sent out in the direction of the enemy
carrier to intercept the expected Skyhawk attack.

Meanwhile, 180nm to the southwest of the British naval commander embarked in
Hermes, Conqueror was reporting the manoeuvres of the Belgrano. In the early
morning of May 2, as the attack from the north appeared to be inminent, the
Conqueror reported that the Argentinian cruiser had abruptly changed course
and was following an aimless zigzag just outside the Total Exclusion Zone
and only a short distance from the relative shallow waters of the Burwood
Bank.

If the cruiser were to separate from her escorts and make a dash across
this bank, Conqueror would be placed at a distinct disadvantage, with her
freedom to manoeuvre inhibited by the area of shallows, and in only a few
hours, as the inminent Argentinian air attack shaped up in the north the
Belgrano could be close enough to the British to fire her Exocets (surface
range 22nm). In addition, the Belgrano had been observed refuelling from the
tanker Puerta de Rosalies during the earlier part of May 1. To the British
command all signs were that she was about to close on their force in
coordination with the enemy group to the north: the classical pincer
movement. The British government immediately agreed to a request to change
the rules of engagement allowing an attack on both the Belgrano and the
Veinticinco de Mayo.

As dawn broke the Argentinian carrier turned into what little wind there
was, but even at her top speed of around 24-25 knots she was unable to
create sufficient wind over the deck to launch the fully fuelled and armed
Skyhawks. At the same time, reconaissance had revealed that the distance
between the two fleets was opening and had already increased to 180nm, and
if the aircraft were to dump fuel to reduce take-off weight, they would have
insufficient to reach the British fleet. Admiral Allara turned his ships
away to the north.

Meanwhile, some some 500nm to the south, Conqueror manoeuvred to attack the
Belgrano. At 18.57, at a range of 1,400yd (1,300m) on the cruiser's port
beam, the submarine fired a salvo of three Mk 8 torpedoes. The Argentinian
destroyers commenced a submarine search pattern immediately after the
torpedoes struck the Belgrano, carryng out several depth charge attacks,
while Conqueror withdrew to the east. At 19.45 the now abandoned Belgrano
sank.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

So it could be said that the sinking of the Belgrano was not an isolate act
of gratuite destruction but the only kill of the most crucial aeronaval
battle of the war.

Regards.

Taki Kogoma (e)k <8jggit$...@boofura.swcp.com> mezuan idatzi du...

Regards.

- Bruce T

Part of the problem might lie in the catapults... I don't know when 25
de Mayo got her catapults, but I'm not certain they were enormously
modern.

Thanks for identifying yourself as associated with AWL.  You join them in
the killfile.  *PLONK*

--
Grasping another opportunity to be wrong! Doug Huffman<dhuff...@awod.com>

However:

Correct me if I am wrong, but the bombing of Serbia was legally more dicey
than the sinking of the Belgrano; NATO got away with that. (Just.) But no
state of war existed.

Are you saying that war has to be formally declared in the way that
Chamberlain did in WW2. (Today I sent a letter to the German embassy etc.)
Or are you saying that there has to be a state of armed hostility between
nations that constitutes war?

I have to be honest and say I think it is the latter. Otherwise, if you were
attacked out of the blue, you would not be able to retaliate until you had
gone through the formalities of declaring a formal state of war. Goodbye
self-defence actions.

Therefore, when Argentina invaded the Falklands, (British territory,
technically British people, British Royal Marines defending!!!,) they
initiated a state of war. (Now here's a thought, if I am wrong, and it is
the former that is the case, the Argies never declared.... we could sue
them,) Therefore, any retaliatory actions were surely justified?

I think that the imposition of the TEZ, taking into account the views
expressed elsewhere in the NG, can be seen as a stay out to the Argies, but
no assurances or signals were given to the Argies that nothing outside this
zone was attacked. (After the big buck raids, Mirages that were earmarked to
go to Stanley were held back for Argie airspace, afraid that their airbases
would be next.... They never felt that they were safe.....)

If a state of war existed, then surely an enemy cruiser, armed to the teeth
with radar and missiles and guns, constituted a threat to the British fleet,
whether at that moment in time or at a future date? This thing about "she
turned around" may be significant to some, but it fails to address the point
that she was a ship of war that was going to be deployed against us.

If she had destroyed a British ship, then no doubt the question we would be
asking now is why we never took the shot when we had it. At the end of the
day, British Sailors and British ships were deeply important to us, and we
wanted to protect them. We were entitled too!

Cheers

Nathan

++++++++++

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people and their opinions. If you are offended by anything I say, sincere
apologies.

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