To Armor or not to Armor (was: 6 inch gun cruiser...)
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To Armor or not to Armor (was: 6 inch gun cruiser...)  
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1.  ANDREW BREEN  
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 Mais opções 1 dez 1998, 01:43
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: a...@aber.ac.uk (ANDREW BREEN)
Data: 1998/11/29
Assunto: Re: To Armor or not to Armor (was: 6 inch gun cruiser...)
In article <366035E7.9EBEA...@ibm.net>, Eric Pinnell  <epin...@ibm.net> wrote:

>Per Andersson wrote:>
>> Put _that- on a ship, will ya?

>> Per Andersson

>   Actual frontal armor on a M1A2 Abrams main battle tank is 600 millimeters,
>or 23.62" of armor.

>Eric Pinnell

Hmm. About the same as "Inflexible", then. But then she only had
the thick stuff over a very small patch of ship (around the turret
bases) and relied on elaborate compartmentalisation (for her time)
elsewhere. It's certainly interesting that the only nation to
build second-generation citadel ships (the Italians) abandoned
the side armour altogether, with "Italia" and "Lepanto" depending
totally on subdivision for protection against damage.

--
Andy Breen ~    PPARC Advanced Research Fellow
                Solar Physics Group
                University of Wales, Aberystwyth
                My posting, my opinions......


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The hybrid carrier fallacy  
1.  Thomas Schoene  
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 Mais opções 1 dez 1998, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Thomas Schoene" <TomScho...@worldnet.att.net>
Data: 1998/12/01
Assunto: Re: The hybrid carrier fallacy
Charles Gray <n...@null.net> wrote in article
<36623df4.18453...@news.jps.net>...
>    Heres a question-- is there ever a good reason to compromise a
> carriers aircraft capacity by loading it down with other weapons?  
>    In this, I'm largely looking at the midrange CGSN designs
> famous in the 1970's

I assume you're thinking of the through-deck concepts by Reuven
Leopold.  I'd argue that such an air-capable strike cruiser was a
potentially viable concept in its era, but only if

a) you regarded it not as an aircraft carrier with missiles, but as a
cruiser with a large air complement for long range target acquisition

b) you needed a sea-control, surface warfare type platform

Thus, the CSGN is very similar in role to the reactivated BBs, and
would now likely be white elephants.  They might have been useful in
situations like the Persian Gulf tanker war, where the ability to
carry a fairly large complement of armed helicopters was useful.
However, it took carrier aviation secure the air superiority that
would make such a ship effective, so it isn't a realistic carrier
replacement.

and the current Russian carrier with its SS

> missile farm on the flight deck.  [snip]
>    Now, since a carrier's main job is to carry aircraft, it seems
> like the Russian move is a self defeating one, since those missiles
> take up space that could be used for a hanger, and unlike an
aircraft,
> can't be changed out or replaced just by flying a new one out to
the
> ship.

Absolutely correct.  It only makes any sense if you regard the air
wing as a purely defensive asset.  Given that the Russians didn't go
for real multi-role swing aircraft until quite recently, they may
have felt it was impossible to include both fighters and strike
aircraft in a small air wing.  However, they  would have still been
better off expanding the air wing and relying on other ships for
offensive firepower.  

>    On the other hand, a smaller carrier, especially one more like
> a WWII cruiser in its duties then the Currant CVN's might need some
> form of  added weaponry, beyond point defense.  However, is such a
> ship doable, or just another incarnation of a "fleet in one ship"
> fallacy that occasionally rears it's ugly head?

In general, the later seems to be true.  A few Western-style SSMs
could be added at relatively low ship impact, but if a carrier is
that close to its foes, it's made a mistake of the first order.  (The
Italian Garibaldi design seems like a fair exception, since the Med
is very constricted and you simply might have no option but to get
close to your enemy)  On the other hand, adding area air defense
imposes a fairly significant ship impact.  Consider the Invincibles.
Not only did the SAM magazine and mechanism eat up hull volume,
fitting the launcher on centerline restricted the deck layout,
shortening the takeoff roll and eliminating at least one helo spot.

>    For another question-- should ships be designed in the future
> with UCAV's.  (for instance a DDG with specialized UCAV handling
gear,
> where the UCAV's also function as part of its "main battery"), or
> should we simply stick with VTOL helicopter platform based UAV's
for
> cruiser and destroyers, and keep the more specialized ones on
> carriers, accepting the reduced number of manned aircraft?

Assuming that UCAVs are reusable and require conventional ordnance,
they more or less have to go on dedicated aviation ships with
sufficient magazine and fuel capacity to keep them armed and flying
for several days at a time.  A destroyer-sized ship won't have enough
ordnance for more than a few strikes without giving up a substantial
portion of its other capabilities or becoming much larger than a
conventional ship without UCAV capabilities.  

There might be a useful role for UCAV control capabilities on
land-attack ships like DD-21, akin to the fighter control
capabilities of earlier escorts.

--
--------------------------------------------------
TomScho...@worldnet.att.net
*Insert pithy quote here*


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2.  David Bofinger  
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 Mais opções 1 dez 1998, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: David Bofinger <David.Bofin...@dsto.defence.gov.au>
Data: 1998/12/01
Assunto: Re: The hybrid carrier fallacy
One reason people might go for hybrid carriers is because they just
don't need a large number of aircraft badly enough to justify filling
up an entire large ship with aircraft. They might not be able to have
a smaller carrier (stability? deck space? runway length?) but they can
have a large ship which can also do something else.

Not saying it works in practice, but I don't think the idea can be
dismissed as easily as it was in the original post.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
David Bofinger                      David.Bofin...@dsto.defence.gov.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------


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3.  Thomas Schoene  
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 Mais opções 1 dez 1998, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Thomas Schoene" <TomScho...@worldnet.att.net>
Data: 1998/12/01
Assunto: Re: The hybrid carrier fallacy
Diego Mantilla <manti...@erols.com> wrote in article
<73vn8q$eq...@winter.news.rcn.net>...

> Paul J. Adam wrote in message

<3ag5AqAr$yY2E...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>...

> >Even there... the Invincibles will be losing their Sea Dart
capability
> >in order to free up space for land-attack weaponry and another
aircraft
> >in the deck park.

> I thought the Sea Dart battery was replaced by a Phalanx CIWS.

Nope.  They have had both Sea Dart and CIWS since right after the
Falklands War (Originally one ship had Phalanx, but they all have
Goalkeeper now) .  The removal of Sea Dart is specifically to
increase deck space and create magazine space for air-to-ground
ordnance for RAF Harriers.

--
--------------------------------------------------
TomScho...@worldnet.att.net
*Insert pithy quote here*


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4.  Andrew C. Toppan  
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 Mais opções 1 dez 1998, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: actop...@gwi.net (Andrew C. Toppan)
Data: 1998/12/01
Assunto: Re: The hybrid carrier fallacy
Franz (franz@NIH!card-net.org) was seen to write:

> I disagree.  To gain experience in carrier operations, nothing beats
> practical experience.  They started off in conservative ways.  They had no
> experience in operating aircraft from a vessel.  They started small and
> pursued more ambitious projects as experience developed.

I'm not sure if you're talking about the French or the Russians here,
since previous posts have referred to both.  In either case, you're
incorrect.

1) The French have been operating aircraft carriers since 1927, and
continuously since the end of WWII.  They've got plenty of experience.

2) The Soviets/Russians did not "start off in conservative ways" or "start
small".  They built their primary surface combatants as aircraft-carrying
ships at a time when they had no experience with carriers.  As a result,
their primary surface combatants were terribly inefficient and largely
useless.  A "conservative" approach would have been to build a small
trials-type carrier to gain experience, prior to making a major investment
in aircraft-carrying surface combatants.  Had they done this, their
investment in real warships would have produced a much better return.

--
Andrew Toppan   ---   actop...@gwi.net   ---   "I speak only for myself"
US Naval & Shipbuilding Museum/USS Salem Online - http://www.uss-salem.org/
Naval History, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more


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5.  RWWells  
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 Mais opções 1 dez 1998, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: rwwe...@aol.com (RWWells)
Data: 1998/12/01
Assunto: Re: The hybrid carrier fallacy

>   During WW II the Japanese converted two older BBs into sea-plane
>carrier/battleships (made a complete hash out of it I admit) . The
>concept was NOT to put more *offensive* aircraft into the air but was
>an attempt to significantly improve the air *defence* capability of
>these ships, allowing them to close with the enemy and "do what
>battleships do" with gunfire.

I thought the idea was an extension of the successful Tone class cruisers, to
supply the IJN with additional scouting assets. Had all 5 seaplane warships
(Tone, Chikuma, Mogami, Ise and Hyuga) operated with the carrier force, the
combined scout plane force was larger than a single carrier's complete strike
force. (Actually, since Kates were the primary carrier based scout, it would
take 3 carriers to generate an equivalent scouting force.) Of course, by the
time the conversions were completed, the Japanese no longer had enough planes
to equip the conversions.

In practice, these and the various other hybrid carrier designs faced the major
problem of the vulnerbility of the aviation fuel and thinly protected flight
areas to hostile gunfire. The various cruiser actions off Guadal Canal were
replete with fires in the seaplane handling areas; more planes would just make
the problem worse. Since planes will get bigger and heavier, the restricted
size of the smaller operational flight deck will merely serve to reduce the
hybrid's operational life span.

Were the Soviet designs of cruisers with improved local air support a useful
design in the armour limited missile era? I have no idea. I like them from a
utility standpoint, but I doubt they were more cost-effective than splitting
the functions between two hulls. Though it would probably help the USN to have
VTOL fighters operating should fleet carrier be damaged, but fortunately the US
could count on allies supplying those useful missions.

Richard Wells


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6.  Ken & Laura Chaddock  
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 Mais opções 1 dez 1998, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: Ken & Laura Chaddock <chadd...@istar.ca>
Data: 1998/12/01
Assunto: Re: The hybrid carrier fallacy

   It was my impression that, while they may have carried more scouting
assets, they were primarily intended to carry A6M2-N and N1K floatplane
fighters (18 out of 22 a/c). The fact that they never shipped a
significant
airgroup also certainly corresponds to availability (or lack there of)
since
there were over 1400 E13A and E13B float recon birds built but only some
327
A6M2-N and 97 N1K fighters built.

> In practice, these and the various other hybrid carrier designs faced the major
> problem of the vulnerbility of the aviation fuel and thinly protected flight
> areas to hostile gunfire. The various cruiser actions off Guadal Canal were
> replete with fires in the seaplane handling areas; more planes would just make
> the problem worse. Since planes will get bigger and heavier, the restricted
> size of the smaller operational flight deck will merely serve to reduce the
> hybrid's operational life span.

   Depends upon how they are built and armoured. It wasn't impossible to
put
relatively heavy armour on a flight deck, the British showed the way
here and
if the protective scheme were properly managed fuel tankage would be no
more vunerable than magazine spaces.
   The fact that relatively lightly armoured crusiers whose aircraft
storage
and handling arrangements were, at best, after thoughts, cannot be
compared
to a properly configured "carrier".
   The useful life is certainly an issue, as the British found out with
armoured, inclosed hanger carriers after the war.

...Ken


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7.  Paul J. Adam  
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 Mais opções 1 dez 1998, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Paul J. Adam" <P...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>
Data: 1998/12/01
Assunto: Re: The hybrid carrier fallacy
In article <73vn8q$eq...@winter.news.rcn.net>, Diego Mantilla
<manti...@erols.com> writes

>Paul J. Adam wrote in message <3ag5AqAr$yY2E...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>...
>>Even there... the Invincibles will be losing their Sea Dart capability
>>in order to free up space for land-attack weaponry and another aircraft
>>in the deck park.

>I thought the Sea Dart battery was replaced by a Phalanx CIWS.

Nope. I was aboard Invincible not too long ago, and she still had her
Sea Dart, plus three Goalkeeper CIWS. Ark's just lost her SAMs during
her refit, IIRC.

--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...            

Paul J. Adam                                  p...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk  


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8.  Andrew C. Toppan  
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 Mais opções 1 dez 1998, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: actop...@gwi.net (Andrew C. Toppan)
Data: 1998/12/01
Assunto: Re: The hybrid carrier fallacy
Diego Mantilla (manti...@erols.com) was seen to write:

> I thought the Sea Dart battery was replaced by a Phalanx CIWS.

Uhh, no, the INVINCIBLEs currently have BOTH Sea Dart and CIWS (Phalanx or
Goalkeeper).  That's how it's been for years.  Soon the Sea Dart will be
removed to expand the deck, just as the previous person said.

--
Andrew Toppan   ---   actop...@gwi.net   ---   "I speak only for myself"
US Naval & Shipbuilding Museum/USS Salem Online - http://www.uss-salem.org/
Naval History, World Navies Today, Photo Features, Military FAQs, and more


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9.  unicorn  
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 Mais opções 2 dez 1998, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: unic...@NOJUNKbridgenet.com.au (unicorn)
Data: 1998/12/02
Assunto: Re: The hybrid carrier fallacy
In article <36633e7...@news1.ibm.net>, rmri...@ibm.net says...

>Franz wrote in message ...
>>To equip a carrier with ASM's and such would only be appropriate
>>if she was also equipped with sub-standard aircraft.  The Russian aircraft
>>on these two classes meet that criteria.  If the aircraft were better, the
>>weapons would not be needed.

>If only "sub-standard" aircraft are available, then they shouldn't have
>built carriers in the first place.

Oh really??  I seem to remember that the USN built some sub-standard
aircraft in its time.  The Soviets were starting from scratch and made
up a lot of ground in a fairly short space of time.  The Forgers were
a limited piece of kit but were lineal ancestors to todays maritime
Flankers, which are a sensational piece of kit, up there with Rafale
and the F/A-18A.  You have to crawl before you can sprint.

That makes it look like they built

>carriers just to say that they have carriers (France and the CDG come to
>mind on this as well**).

It was always the French desire to have multiple carriers, it is just
that the cost of Charles De Gaulle is such that a second carrier has been
pushed a long way right on the procurement schedule.

To arm a carrier with ASMs and area SAMs implies

>that threats/targets will be inside of its aircraft strike range. This is
>not a good situation for a high value unit. They would have been better
>served just building surface combatants armed with such weaponry.

I take it then you are discounting the value of organic, on the scene when
you need it CAP??

The only

>navies that should consider CVs are those which desire power projection
>capability- and those countries should build clean carriers (i.e. all they
>do is operate aircraft like US carriers or post-Sea Dart removal UK
>carriers).

This is just arrogance.  Not everyone operates carriers in power
projection roles.  The Spanish Principe De Asturias and Italian Garibaldi
class carriers are extremely well designed carriers that fulfill the roles
for which they were designed, without breaking the national budget.

The cost of the US style CTOL carrier is such that many nations gave away
conventional carrier operations as the cost of replacing WW2 ex-RN
carriers with modern CTOL carriers.  Canada, Australia, Argentina, The
Netherlands and India all got out of CTOL ops and either gave away
carrier aviation or moved to VSTOL ops.

Not every nation can afford the US style answer to carrier operations.

Some seek other answers such as VSTOL, others just reorient their
capabilities and specialties into other areas.

Regards

Unicorn


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