New Monitors not BBs
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New Monitors not BBs  
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1.  Dave Welsh  
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 Mais opções 1 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Dave Welsh" <dwe...@deltanet.com>
Data: 1998/07/01
Assunto: New Monitors not BBs

From the ongoing discussion raging in this NG on battleships, it is clear
that there is a significant body of opinion that holds that shore
bombardment is an important task that is presently not adequately served
without major caliber gun vessels.

It also seems clear that the day of the BB as a major combatant is over, and
that these vessels are too expensive to maintain as limited capability
bombardment ships.

Proposal:

Build up to 6 monitors using the turrets from 2 of the Iowas. Each monitor
has one 3 gun turret. There is no need for heavy armor protection as they
will not be designed to fight battleships.

The monitor should be a 25 knot 10,000 ton ship with a reasonable outfit of
5 inch guns, a small outfit of cruise missiles, sensors and defensive
weapons including an ASW helo hanger and pad. Crew about 200.

There will be few shore bombardment missions that 3x16 inch guns will not
deal with, particularly if they are optimized for bombardment with heeling
tanks, to further increase the range, and have a large magazine filled with
300 RPG of super high capacity HE shells, shells carrying submunitions,
smart guidance munitions, subcaliber 12" discarding sabot rounds and shells
with rocket boost to range up to 50 miles inland.

With this strategy, USN would have 6 relatively small, modern vessels with
decent AA/ASW survivability and the capability to inflict major pain on any
adversary vulnerable to long range heavy caliber bombardment. That includes
most of the Mediterranean and large parts of the rest of the world. A
bombardment from one of these vessels could, in properly chosen situations,
be about as effective as a small to medium air strike. It would have the
advantage of not putting pilots at risk. The cruise missile outfit would
provide additional range for small surgical strikes (as distinguished from
extensive bombardments).

With these assets, USN could have the option of small task forces (2 to 5
ships) providing a force projection capability without committing a CV task
group.

Comments?

Dave Welsh
dwe...@deltanet.com


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2.  Dave Welsh  
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 Mais opções 1 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Dave Welsh" <dwe...@deltanet.com>
Data: 1998/07/01
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs

Andrew C. Toppan wrote in message <6neori$8t...@noc1.gwi.net>...

>(1) Single-missions ships are EXTREMELY unpopular with the Navy and
>Congress.  Monitors such as these would be absolutely and completely
>useless for _any_ mission other than large-scale fire support.

Large scale fire support is a mission that many seem to believe is not
really being fulfilled by any of the multipurpose ships. The question is not
so much whether a single-mission ship is de facto bad, it is whether the
mission is important and whether another ship that is NOT single-mission can
adequately support the fire support mission.

In WWII, in Korea, in Vietnam and finally in Desert Storm the usefulness and
even criticality of this fire support has been demonstrated. In one battle
after another it either did a lot to reduce casualties, or (as at Normandy
and Salerno) broke the back of enemy resistance. Seems to me that before we
irrevocably abandon the last assets that can provide it, we had better be
REALLY REALLY SURE that this kind of fire support will not be needed again.

What is the rationale for concluding that large scale fire support won't be
needed? Has the US Marine Corps been heard from on this? After all, if the
wrong decision is made here, it will be the Marines who die first ...

And since when has popularity with Navy brass and Congress become the sole
determinant of whether an idea is good?

>(2) The Navy does not expect to make landings of the sort that would
>require large-scale heavy fire support.  Therefore, these ships would be
>without any mission at all.

Until we get into another war where the Navy's planning doesn't match
developments.
The Navy's planning for WWII had the USN battle line fighting the IJN battle
line in the Marshalls. And until just before the event, it did not
contemplate major amphibious landings. As a result a crash program to build
landing craft was necessary.

The Navy didn't plan at all for Korea or for Vietnam, but had major missions
in each conflict where the BBs were needed.

Landing craft can be built relatively quickly, but heavy gun systems take
about 3 years to construct AFTER the design is complete and the
manufacturing plant is built.

>(3) These ships would not offer any capability that could not be provided
>for less money, in less time, and more effectively by other platforms.

I keep reading this but there is no convincing backup provided. Maybe you've
seen it, I haven't. What other platforms are capable of providing large
scale fire support?

Before we dismiss the need for heavy gun bombardments by saying that air
strikes will do the job, let's recall that some terrain (like the Bekaa
valley) is very unfavorable for air strikes. There is also the issue of
pilot casualties and captives becoming hostages. Finally, expensive though a
BB may be, it doesn't cost nearly as much as a CVN to operate. Will the Navy
always have enough CVNs to cover every trouble spot?

>(4) The cost of dismantling, reconditioning and reassembling six ancient
>turrets would be extremely high - several billion dollars probably.

Why can't the existing turrets be installed, more or less as is, on new
barbette structures? They are basically self contained units, very rugged
and presumably very durable. What is wrong with them to require all this
work? One would think that the major expense would be in new low-labor
magazines and shell handling rooms.

>(5) 10,000 tons is way too small.  The British monitors of WWII were
>around 10,000 tons, and they only carried _two_ 15" guns.  The rotating
>weight of a triple 16/50 turret is 1700 tons; supporting structures,
>magazines, etc. would bring this weight to 3000-4000 tons.  We'll need a
>20,000 ton ship to carry all this.

Is this conclusion really supported by the facts you cite? Simple scaling
says that a 1300 ton twin 15" mount on a 10,000 ton ship (I presume you are
referring to Erebus and Terror) results in a 13,300 ton ship to carry a 1700
ton triple 16" turret.

Now consider that the British monitors were built of low grade steel, had a
significant amount of armor plate and torpedo bulges, and a heavy
inefficient steam power plant instead of gas turbines. Surely a couple of
thousand tons go away with construction advances.

>(6) The public outcry over the destruction of two IOWA class ships would
>be deafening - the Navy doesn't need any more bad PR!

Why? If the ships are as useless as you say they are (and I think I agree),
then what can possibly be gained by keeping them laying around in mothballs?
Surely two Iowas will satisfy the need for preservation as museums. This
way, if the monitor concept does make sense (and I'm waiting to see what
others have to say before I really make up my own mind), the Navy would get
some use out of these vessels. If they aren't used this way, the logical
thing to do is scrap them.

>(7) Be prepared to invest hundreds of millions in building munitions
>plants to turn out 16/50 shells and charges.  The existing stocks of
>powder and shells, in addition to being half a century old, are quite
>small.

Agreed. If the concept works, I don't think $200 million in plant investment
is too much. Remember that these shells and charges are very cheap compared
to missiles.

>Why not get rid this insane fascination with 16/50 guns (a gun that was
>designed to kill enemy battleships) and talk about _practical_ fire
>support solutions?  Things like ERGM, the 5/62 gun, VGAS, Strike SM-2,
>TLAM, SLAM....

This isn't an insane fascination with a particular model, it is simply
recognition that THESE ARE THE ONLY HEAVY GUNS LEFT. I would rather have an
updated version of the rapid fire 8 inch, but they are gone forever...

Can any 5 inch gun, no matter how advanced, really be a satisfactory
bombardment weapon? If so, why would the US Army keep weapons of calibre
larger than 155 mm? If missiles really can do the job, why does the Army
keep artillery instead of relying on missiles?

A lot of bytes have been devoted above to the cost of the heavy gun
solution. What do these other weapons systems cost? How do we know they can
do the job? Will they be there when needed?

A final question: The US Army operates many types of aircraft which are
basically useful only in a ground support role. The reason that the Army
developed this capability is that the Air Force was busy planning for a
nuclear air war and had no interest in ground support. The usefulness, even
the vital necessity, of these ground support aircraft is (I believe) now
admitted by all. So why is it justifiable to say that the Navy should not
have a ground support ship? If a single mission aircraft like the A-10 is
justified for the important role of killing tanks, why isn't a single
mission ship justified if it has an important role to play?

Dave Welsh
dwe...@deltanet.com


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3.  JacobsenGM  
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 Mais opções 2 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: jacobse...@aol.com (JacobsenGM)
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs

Dave Welsh from dwe...@deltanet.com wrote:

>What is the rationale for concluding that >large scale fire support won't be
>needed? Has the US Marine Corps been >heard from on this? After all, if the
>wrong decision is made here, it will be the >Marines who die first ...

To summarize, the rationale is simply that the USMC now has technology that
allows the assault of a great deal more territory than just well defended
beaches.  We continue to fall into the trap of thinking of wars in a past
context.  We will not be fighting beach conflicts like we did in WWII.
Amphibious technology has been continuing to develop since WWII, so glorious
assaults onto well defended beaches will probablly never again be seen, at
least by US Marines.  We have too much ability to reduce strongpoints with
precicion weaponry as well as avoid strongpoints with much more flexible
amphibious assault technology (LCACs and Helos) than the WWII or Korea days.

> Seems to me that before we
>irrevocably abandon the last assets that can >provide it, we had better be
>REALLY REALLY SURE that this kind of >fire support will not be needed again.

By eliminatign the Battleships, we are eliminating a ship that was designed to
kill other ships with guns.  Its shore bombardment role was secondary.  We are
maiking, today, weapons and gun systems that are much more efficient and
effective than Battleships could ever be.  This fire support, although aewsome,
can be done better by modern technologies designed for the purpose.

>The Navy didn't plan at all for Korea or for >Vietnam, but had major missions
>in each conflict where the BBs were needed.

True, but from my recollection, the contribution of the Navy to either of these
conflicts from fire support ships was marginal.  We were simply using available
ships to provide what support we could.  Each and every one of those
bombardment ships were originally designed for gunfighitng of one sort or
another against other ships...the main role of the Navy (then and now).  Why
should our ships of today be any different?  The Navy's main role is protecting
Sea Lines of Communication and National Defence.  Anything above and beyond
that is gravy.  Retaining an expensive old ship that is useful in a role for
which she was not originally designed is not sensible...

>>(3) These ships would not offer any capability that could not be provided
>>for less money, in less time, and more effectively by other platforms.

>I keep reading this but there is no convincing backup provided. Maybe you've
>seen it, I haven't. What other platforms are capable of providing large
>scale fire support?

Aircraft Carriers and their organic air plus Tomohawk missiles from a variety
of sources fill the need today that Battleships have traditionally been called
for.  Even in the Gulf War, the battleship's role was quite limited when
compared to that of Naval Air.  Aircraft flew Thousands of sorties and dropped
thousands of bombs, both of the dumb and smart variety.  The battleships, by
comparison, could count the number of missions and targets they engaged on one
hand (in fairness, they shot around 80 missions).  The real comparison should
be in battle damage assessment.  I believe there would be no real arguement
that the carriers destroyed and suppressed much more than the battleships.  We
don't need more battleships since they do not contribute to the Navy exept for
very specific roles and in very specific circumstances.  The Navy must remain
able to respond to all sorts of contigencies, hence it is leaning towards a
smaller ship that is more capable in the Land Attack arena.

>Why can't the existing turrets be installed, more or less as is, on new
>barbette structures?

Same old arguement...Too expenisve and too limited in their role.

>...I don't think $200 million in plant investment
>is too much. Remember that these shells and charges are very cheap compared
>to missiles.

But the fact remains that the ships themselves are_quite_espensive to operate.
The Navy cannot justify keeping the battleships around in the interm years for
such a narrow role.

>Can any 5 inch gun, no matter how advanced, really be a satisfactory
>bombardment weapon? If so, why would the US Army keep weapons of calibre
>larger than 155 mm?

This is a ctitical point.  I must agree here.  The fact is that the Navy of
today does not really fill the desires of the Marine Corps for heavy fire
support...yet.  The heavier weapons the army has (The marines used to have
them, too) were there for heavy fire support, naturally.  The navy opted to
keep 5in guns over 8in since they were both a better fit in to the technology
of the fleet of the time as well as best supported the Navy's main effort
(then) of planning to win a protrated fleet action against a strong foe (Big
bad old Soviet Union).  That paticular necessity has gone by the wayside, so
now the Navy can focus more on the fringe efforts of littoral warfare, which it
is doing at a very rapid pace.

>If missiles really can do the job, why does the Army
>keep artillery instead of relying on missiles?

Because these very effective missiles tend to kill indiscrimanently since their
effects cover a very wide area and the fact that they generate a mini-mine
field of unexploded grenades if front line troops have to maneuver through the
area that was just shot.

>A lot of bytes have been devoted above to the cost of the heavy gun
>solution. What do these other weapons systems cost? How do we know they can
>do the job? Will they be there when needed?

I would argue that by building an entire class of DDs that can provide very
good fire support, you get a far better chance of haivng a very capable asset
at the right place at the righ time.  A battleship cannot be every place at
every time.  With only 2 units in the world, as compared to (for arguements
sake) 30-40 of these new DDs, you would have a very good chance of seeing the
DDs early, when you need them in the first stages of a conflict, rathern than
up to a month later when they finally steam into the theater.

>The usefulness, even
>the vital necessity, of these ground support aircraft is (I believe) now
>admitted by all. So why is it justifiable to say that the Navy should not
>have a ground support ship?

In point of fact, the Navy _is_ making a ship that is designed to provide
ground support...actually it is one of the first blue water ships with this as
identified as one of its main missions.  All previous blue water ships (frigate
size and above) built since World War I have had shore bombardment as only a
secondary operational mission. (Technology demonstrators and the like
nonwithstanding.)  This meant that the Navy planners did not build the weapon
systems to support the role, but modified the existing ones to support shore
bombardment as best they could.  Granted, in WWII there were a few assault
support ships, but even these were first built as troop carriers and were later
modified by the addition of rocket launchers.  What we are now seeing today is
a ship that is going to be built from the keel up with shore fire as a primary
role...a revolutionary concept in the modern sense.

Gordon Jacobsen
JACOBSE...@AOL.COM


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4.  Dave Welsh  
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 Mais opções 2 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Dave Welsh" <dwe...@deltanet.com>
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs

Paul J. Adam wrote in message <$4sbIFBmsAn1E...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>...
>In article <6ngtnm$hr...@news01.deltanet.com>, Dave Welsh
><dwe...@deltanet.com> writes
(snip)
>This is the endless circularity of the argument. We apparently need a
>battleship because the enemy defences are so strong that any less-
>armoured ship will be sunk in an eyeblink and no US aviator can fly
>anywhere that might offer any risk to his chances of safe return. But
>there _are_ threats that can kill the battleship... so it won't go in
>harm's way until these threats have been neutralised.

For "battleship" read "monitor." We need a monitor only if it is clear that
we do need heavy gunfire support.
I agree that air strikes can do almost (not quite) everything that gunfire
support can. But surely it will be less costly to provide a fire support
ship (as some are suggesting as an alternative to a classic monitor) instead
of a CV or CVN.
The best approach in an amphibious assault might be a day or two of
"Mitscher haircuts" from a carrier, then long term support from a fire
support ship. The carrier assets can go off to other tasks and be better
utilized this way.

>If you've found and destroyed the enemy's antiship weapons and mobile
>artillery from the air, you've spent long enough stooging around over
>his beach in assorted aircraft that you've by now, from necessity,
>eliminated most of his air defence network too.

See above. Air attacks can do everything except:
They can't cover two widely separated areas from one carrier;
They can't conduct sustained operations without losing pilots.

>So what's left for the battleship to do? Close support of troops? The
>16" is a terrible weapon for that. Bunker busting? If you want to
>penetrate feet of concrete, it's quicker to do it with LGBs than with
>salvoes of battleship fire. Defence suppression? But the defences are
>already gone.

The defences that are engaging the troops are not all gone.

>>the bombardment ship can get down to the job of
>>providing artillery support for the landing force, destroying strong
points
>>etc.

>Strong points - better handled by air power.

Not always. There are some that are very difficult to approach from the air.

>Close support of troops - can't be done with 16" weapons.

A 16 inch gun is an effective area saturation weapon, particularly if loaded
with submunitions carrying shells. It can be as useful as a napalm strike or
a Dumbo blitz.
16 inch saturation fire can do a magnificent  job of disrupting large armor
formations.
For close support, 5 or 6 inch guns are better.

I have said before that I would rather have a rapid fire 8 inch gun for this
job, but we don't have any of those left. We do have the 16 inch guns.

Dave Welsh
dwe...@deltanet.com


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5.  GIJOEMPY  
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 Mais opções 2 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: gijoe...@aol.com (GIJOEMPY)
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs

>Why not get rid this insane fascination with >16/50 guns (a gun that was
>designed to kill enemy battleships) and talk >about _practical_ fire
>support solutions?  Things like ERGM, the >5/62 gun, VGAS, Strike SM-2,
>TLAM, SLAM....

Because, big guns are cool!  Are missle launches going to intimidate troops on
shore?  No,  But the roar and flame of the 16-inchers? Hell yes!  Plus, you get
that cool whistling sound of artillery shells.

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6.  Glenn Meyer  
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 Mais opções 2 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: Glenn Meyer <Gme...@trinity.edu>
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs

One brief comment:

Why the cruise missles? What's the purpose with such
a vast disparity in range? The cruise missle role
could be better handled with ships with much more
capacity.

What's the proposed target set? Do you really think we
are going to do Pacific Island/ D-Day style invasions
anymore?

Any significant opponent faced with a large invasion fleet
probably would nuke it or have air assets such to put the ship
at risk. Now your CVBGs would have to worry about another
ship?

Remember the Brits splashed a Styx in the Gulf on the way to
a BB.

Last, as pointed out - intimidation value is minimal
against well trained committed and dug in troops.

bye


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7.  Paul J. Adam  
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 Mais opções 2 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Paul J. Adam" <p...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs

In article <1998070218115700.OAA14...@ladder03.news.aol.com>, Krztalizer
<krztali...@aol.com> writes

>I was passing through the Phillipines when there was a local
>commotion at the base when a storekeeper found some incredible number of
>forgotten 16"/50 barrels, at a time when the Navy's BB program was  spoiling
>back up for the 1980s.  Everyone on the base went over to check out the
>behemoth weapons that had lain forgotten for decades at the sprawling supply
>facility.  Those fangs look huuuuuuuge, even pulled out of the turrets.

Go to the Imperial War Museum in London, and they've got two 15"/42s
outside flanking the path into the building. Stand near them, and the
shells they fired, and you understand why 77-man turret crews were
vital.

--
Paul J. Adam


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8.  Dave Welsh  
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 Mais opções 2 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Dave Welsh" <dwe...@deltanet.com>
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs

Krztalizer wrote in message

<1998070208425900.EAA05...@ladder01.news.aol.com>...

>>Proposal:

>>Build up to 6 monitors using the turrets from 2 of the Iowas. Each monitor
>>has one 3 gun turret. There is no need for heavy armor protection as they
>>will not be designed to fight battleships.

>>The monitor should be a 25 knot 10,000 ton ship with a reasonable outfit
of
>>5 inch guns, a small outfit of cruise missiles, sensors and defensive
>>weapons including an ASW helo hanger and pad. Crew about 200.

(snip)

Also remember that Monitor's sank in heavy

>weather.  Not a good trait to recreate.

Even the WWII monitors were quite seaworthy, just not very fast or agile.

>Perhaps we should consider modifying
>your idea in some way to include SeaShadow ("CSS Virginia ver 2000")
technology
>as well.  If you want to really use all the old supplies, I might
suggestyou
>could even fill the magazines with grape shot, and find a way to recreate
Greek
>Fire..

Hooray! Don't forget those ballistae and catapults too!!
Seriously, using old supplies is not the issue -- it's using an existing gun
system. The shells and charges aren't that difficult to make. The guns are.
Have you ever seen a gun lathe that size?

Dave Welsh
dwe...@deltanet.com


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9.  Velovich  
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 Mais opções 2 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: velov...@aol.com (Velovich)
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs

  Look - last I heard, Marines afloat are grouped much as carrier groups are.
Correct me if I'm wrong...

  So - there will be other combatants.  That is, other targets.  IF this
proposed vessel has a single twin Standard mount (the old ones, I know...),
with a limited magazine, it can contribute to the group's defense from air
threats.

  I'm just an ARMY grunt, and I know this much.  If you want to argue just to
shut him up, do better.  I say this simply because you're sniping, and it seems
you didn't think about the ship in an actual operational environment.  Hence,
my conclusion.  If this is TRULY not the case, I apologise.

  >At 25

>knots, for example, the Navy probably wouldn't consider this ship to be
>fast enough to operate on smash and dash missions, and it would bog down a
>carrier group.

  well, how fast are gator freighters?  do they go 30+ kts?  And as far as
carriers, they and this won't be found together, so there's no need to go that
fast!!!  Differing missions, even thought there is overlap.

>Without a carrier to provide air cover, is this thing going to have such
>good AA gear that it will not need help?  

Agian, most large USN vessels (correct me if I'm wrong) travel in groups.  So
each member of the group can contribute to the overall defence.

  Instead of focussing on high-end, massive systems that a dedicated platform
would have - how about:

1 Standard twin arm launcher
1 ASW helo (SH-60)
1 triple 16 in mount

  The helo could only support the group's ASW effort.
  The Standard launcher won't have a lot of ammo, enough for point defence.
Maybe a phalanx instead.

  The guy has an idea that, just as the Air Farce is screwing over the Army in
CAS missions (yeah, the newest F-16 can provide better CAS than the "ageing"
A-10, yeah, that's the ticket!), looks to the navy supporting the Ground troops
as they make a forced entry.

>Another unfortunate
>complication is that the ship can bombard inland only in relation to how
>close it can get to the shore.  Thus, to hit 45 miles inland it could only
>be 5 miles offshore. That brings it within easy range of shore-to-ship
>missiles.

  Unless IQs dropped suddenly as the temps went up, it does make some sense
that the Monitor would start firing up the beach first.  This would have the
increased, very positive benefit of suppressing anti-grunt defences as well as
the anti ship defences...  Someone will correct me here if I missed
something...

  > And it doesn't have heavy armor...  
<SNIP of junk>

  Don't need it!  Over the Horizon is easily done.  Overhead imagery can ID
enemy strong points, UAVs can help adjust fire.

> (a complication for most ship to shore
>bombardment).

  Bull hockey.  USAF and Army A/C dodge Army Arty all the time.  Unless the
Navy can't figure out how to do this too, no problem.

>  To hit shore site from over the horizon with >your guns you
>need targeting capability. Maybe some >UAVs would assist there (Kaching goes
>the cash register).

  Already in the inventory - just need a few more.

>And to give an idea of what the Navy thinks is reasonable for crew costs,
>the new DD-21 class is not supposed to have more than 95 crew (and quite
>possibly less).

  If DD-21 can be highly automated, so can a monitor.

<*>

Velovich
"Who IS Keyser Souze?"

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British subs in WWII  
1.  Drazen Kramaric  
Ver perfil   Traduzir para Traduzido (ver original)
 Mais opções 1 jul 1998, 04:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: dkraNOSPAMm...@www.zap.hr (Drazen Kramaric)
Data: 1998/07/01
Assunto: Re: British subs in WWII

On Wed, 24 Jun 1998 00:06:12 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"

<p...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>I know two HMS Tigers, but they weren't submarines :) I can't find a WW2
>T-boat called 'Tiger".

I know that. I searched for "Tiger" in hope I'll find a reference to
u-boat sunk by "Tiger"in Indian Ocea waters, but I found nothing.

Drax

for reply, delete NOSPAM from my e-mail address


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