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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Dave Welsh" <dwe...@deltanet.com>
Data: 1998/07/01
Assunto: New Monitors not BBs
From the ongoing discussion raging in this NG on battleships, it is clear It also seems clear that the day of the BB as a major combatant is over, and Proposal: Build up to 6 monitors using the turrets from 2 of the Iowas. Each monitor The monitor should be a 25 knot 10,000 ton ship with a reasonable outfit of There will be few shore bombardment missions that 3x16 inch guns will not With this strategy, USN would have 6 relatively small, modern vessels with With these assets, USN could have the option of small task forces (2 to 5 Comments? Dave Welsh É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Dave Welsh" <dwe...@deltanet.com>
Data: 1998/07/01
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs
Andrew C. Toppan wrote in message <6neori$8t...@noc1.gwi.net>... Large scale fire support is a mission that many seem to believe is not >(1) Single-missions ships are EXTREMELY unpopular with the Navy and really being fulfilled by any of the multipurpose ships. The question is not so much whether a single-mission ship is de facto bad, it is whether the mission is important and whether another ship that is NOT single-mission can adequately support the fire support mission. In WWII, in Korea, in Vietnam and finally in Desert Storm the usefulness and What is the rationale for concluding that large scale fire support won't be And since when has popularity with Navy brass and Congress become the sole >(2) The Navy does not expect to make landings of the sort that would Until we get into another war where the Navy's planning doesn't match >require large-scale heavy fire support. Therefore, these ships would be >without any mission at all. developments. The Navy's planning for WWII had the USN battle line fighting the IJN battle line in the Marshalls. And until just before the event, it did not contemplate major amphibious landings. As a result a crash program to build landing craft was necessary. The Navy didn't plan at all for Korea or for Vietnam, but had major missions Landing craft can be built relatively quickly, but heavy gun systems take >(3) These ships would not offer any capability that could not be provided I keep reading this but there is no convincing backup provided. Maybe you've >for less money, in less time, and more effectively by other platforms. seen it, I haven't. What other platforms are capable of providing large scale fire support? Before we dismiss the need for heavy gun bombardments by saying that air >(4) The cost of dismantling, reconditioning and reassembling six ancient Why can't the existing turrets be installed, more or less as is, on new >turrets would be extremely high - several billion dollars probably. barbette structures? They are basically self contained units, very rugged and presumably very durable. What is wrong with them to require all this work? One would think that the major expense would be in new low-labor magazines and shell handling rooms. >(5) 10,000 tons is way too small. The British monitors of WWII were Is this conclusion really supported by the facts you cite? Simple scaling >around 10,000 tons, and they only carried _two_ 15" guns. The rotating >weight of a triple 16/50 turret is 1700 tons; supporting structures, >magazines, etc. would bring this weight to 3000-4000 tons. We'll need a >20,000 ton ship to carry all this. says that a 1300 ton twin 15" mount on a 10,000 ton ship (I presume you are referring to Erebus and Terror) results in a 13,300 ton ship to carry a 1700 ton triple 16" turret. Now consider that the British monitors were built of low grade steel, had a >(6) The public outcry over the destruction of two IOWA class ships would Why? If the ships are as useless as you say they are (and I think I agree), >be deafening - the Navy doesn't need any more bad PR! then what can possibly be gained by keeping them laying around in mothballs? Surely two Iowas will satisfy the need for preservation as museums. This way, if the monitor concept does make sense (and I'm waiting to see what others have to say before I really make up my own mind), the Navy would get some use out of these vessels. If they aren't used this way, the logical thing to do is scrap them. >(7) Be prepared to invest hundreds of millions in building munitions Agreed. If the concept works, I don't think $200 million in plant investment >plants to turn out 16/50 shells and charges. The existing stocks of >powder and shells, in addition to being half a century old, are quite >small. is too much. Remember that these shells and charges are very cheap compared to missiles. >Why not get rid this insane fascination with 16/50 guns (a gun that was This isn't an insane fascination with a particular model, it is simply >designed to kill enemy battleships) and talk about _practical_ fire >support solutions? Things like ERGM, the 5/62 gun, VGAS, Strike SM-2, >TLAM, SLAM.... recognition that THESE ARE THE ONLY HEAVY GUNS LEFT. I would rather have an updated version of the rapid fire 8 inch, but they are gone forever... Can any 5 inch gun, no matter how advanced, really be a satisfactory A lot of bytes have been devoted above to the cost of the heavy gun A final question: The US Army operates many types of aircraft which are Dave Welsh É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: jacobse...@aol.com (JacobsenGM)
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs
Dave Welsh from dwe...@deltanet.com wrote: >What is the rationale for concluding that >large scale fire support won't be To summarize, the rationale is simply that the USMC now has technology that >needed? Has the US Marine Corps been >heard from on this? After all, if the >wrong decision is made here, it will be the >Marines who die first ... allows the assault of a great deal more territory than just well defended beaches. We continue to fall into the trap of thinking of wars in a past context. We will not be fighting beach conflicts like we did in WWII. Amphibious technology has been continuing to develop since WWII, so glorious assaults onto well defended beaches will probablly never again be seen, at least by US Marines. We have too much ability to reduce strongpoints with precicion weaponry as well as avoid strongpoints with much more flexible amphibious assault technology (LCACs and Helos) than the WWII or Korea days. > Seems to me that before we By eliminatign the Battleships, we are eliminating a ship that was designed to >irrevocably abandon the last assets that can >provide it, we had better be >REALLY REALLY SURE that this kind of >fire support will not be needed again. kill other ships with guns. Its shore bombardment role was secondary. We are maiking, today, weapons and gun systems that are much more efficient and effective than Battleships could ever be. This fire support, although aewsome, can be done better by modern technologies designed for the purpose. >The Navy didn't plan at all for Korea or for >Vietnam, but had major missions conflicts from fire support ships was marginal. We were simply using available ships to provide what support we could. Each and every one of those bombardment ships were originally designed for gunfighitng of one sort or another against other ships...the main role of the Navy (then and now). Why should our ships of today be any different? The Navy's main role is protecting Sea Lines of Communication and National Defence. Anything above and beyond that is gravy. Retaining an expensive old ship that is useful in a role for which she was not originally designed is not sensible... >>(3) These ships would not offer any capability that could not be provided Aircraft Carriers and their organic air plus Tomohawk missiles from a variety >>for less money, in less time, and more effectively by other platforms. >I keep reading this but there is no convincing backup provided. Maybe you've of sources fill the need today that Battleships have traditionally been called for. Even in the Gulf War, the battleship's role was quite limited when compared to that of Naval Air. Aircraft flew Thousands of sorties and dropped thousands of bombs, both of the dumb and smart variety. The battleships, by comparison, could count the number of missions and targets they engaged on one hand (in fairness, they shot around 80 missions). The real comparison should be in battle damage assessment. I believe there would be no real arguement that the carriers destroyed and suppressed much more than the battleships. We don't need more battleships since they do not contribute to the Navy exept for very specific roles and in very specific circumstances. The Navy must remain able to respond to all sorts of contigencies, hence it is leaning towards a smaller ship that is more capable in the Land Attack arena. >Why can't the existing turrets be installed, more or less as is, on new Same old arguement...Too expenisve and too limited in their role. >barbette structures? >...I don't think $200 million in plant investment But the fact remains that the ships themselves are_quite_espensive to operate. >is too much. Remember that these shells and charges are very cheap compared >to missiles. The Navy cannot justify keeping the battleships around in the interm years for such a narrow role. >Can any 5 inch gun, no matter how advanced, really be a satisfactory This is a ctitical point. I must agree here. The fact is that the Navy of >bombardment weapon? If so, why would the US Army keep weapons of calibre >larger than 155 mm? today does not really fill the desires of the Marine Corps for heavy fire support...yet. The heavier weapons the army has (The marines used to have them, too) were there for heavy fire support, naturally. The navy opted to keep 5in guns over 8in since they were both a better fit in to the technology of the fleet of the time as well as best supported the Navy's main effort (then) of planning to win a protrated fleet action against a strong foe (Big bad old Soviet Union). That paticular necessity has gone by the wayside, so now the Navy can focus more on the fringe efforts of littoral warfare, which it is doing at a very rapid pace. >If missiles really can do the job, why does the Army Because these very effective missiles tend to kill indiscrimanently since their >keep artillery instead of relying on missiles? effects cover a very wide area and the fact that they generate a mini-mine field of unexploded grenades if front line troops have to maneuver through the area that was just shot. >A lot of bytes have been devoted above to the cost of the heavy gun I would argue that by building an entire class of DDs that can provide very >solution. What do these other weapons systems cost? How do we know they can >do the job? Will they be there when needed? good fire support, you get a far better chance of haivng a very capable asset at the right place at the righ time. A battleship cannot be every place at every time. With only 2 units in the world, as compared to (for arguements sake) 30-40 of these new DDs, you would have a very good chance of seeing the DDs early, when you need them in the first stages of a conflict, rathern than up to a month later when they finally steam into the theater. >The usefulness, even In point of fact, the Navy _is_ making a ship that is designed to provide >the vital necessity, of these ground support aircraft is (I believe) now >admitted by all. So why is it justifiable to say that the Navy should not >have a ground support ship? ground support...actually it is one of the first blue water ships with this as identified as one of its main missions. All previous blue water ships (frigate size and above) built since World War I have had shore bombardment as only a secondary operational mission. (Technology demonstrators and the like nonwithstanding.) This meant that the Navy planners did not build the weapon systems to support the role, but modified the existing ones to support shore bombardment as best they could. Granted, in WWII there were a few assault support ships, but even these were first built as troop carriers and were later modified by the addition of rocket launchers. What we are now seeing today is a ship that is going to be built from the keel up with shore fire as a primary role...a revolutionary concept in the modern sense. Gordon Jacobsen É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Dave Welsh" <dwe...@deltanet.com>
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs
Paul J. Adam wrote in message <$4sbIFBmsAn1E...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>... For "battleship" read "monitor." We need a monitor only if it is clear that >In article <6ngtnm$hr...@news01.deltanet.com>, Dave Welsh ><dwe...@deltanet.com> writes (snip) >This is the endless circularity of the argument. We apparently need a >battleship because the enemy defences are so strong that any less- >armoured ship will be sunk in an eyeblink and no US aviator can fly >anywhere that might offer any risk to his chances of safe return. But >there _are_ threats that can kill the battleship... so it won't go in >harm's way until these threats have been neutralised. we do need heavy gunfire support. I agree that air strikes can do almost (not quite) everything that gunfire support can. But surely it will be less costly to provide a fire support ship (as some are suggesting as an alternative to a classic monitor) instead of a CV or CVN. The best approach in an amphibious assault might be a day or two of "Mitscher haircuts" from a carrier, then long term support from a fire support ship. The carrier assets can go off to other tasks and be better utilized this way. >If you've found and destroyed the enemy's antiship weapons and mobile See above. Air attacks can do everything except: >artillery from the air, you've spent long enough stooging around over >his beach in assorted aircraft that you've by now, from necessity, >eliminated most of his air defence network too. They can't cover two widely separated areas from one carrier; They can't conduct sustained operations without losing pilots. >So what's left for the battleship to do? Close support of troops? The The defences that are engaging the troops are not all gone. >16" is a terrible weapon for that. Bunker busting? If you want to >penetrate feet of concrete, it's quicker to do it with LGBs than with >salvoes of battleship fire. Defence suppression? But the defences are >already gone. >>the bombardment ship can get down to the job of Not always. There are some that are very difficult to approach from the air. >>providing artillery support for the landing force, destroying strong points >>etc. >Strong points - better handled by air power. >Close support of troops - can't be done with 16" weapons. A 16 inch gun is an effective area saturation weapon, particularly if loaded with submunitions carrying shells. It can be as useful as a napalm strike or a Dumbo blitz. 16 inch saturation fire can do a magnificent job of disrupting large armor formations. For close support, 5 or 6 inch guns are better. I have said before that I would rather have a rapid fire 8 inch gun for this Dave Welsh É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: gijoe...@aol.com (GIJOEMPY)
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs
>Why not get rid this insane fascination with >16/50 guns (a gun that was Because, big guns are cool! Are missle launches going to intimidate troops on >designed to kill enemy battleships) and talk >about _practical_ fire >support solutions? Things like ERGM, the >5/62 gun, VGAS, Strike SM-2, >TLAM, SLAM.... shore? No, But the roar and flame of the 16-inchers? Hell yes! Plus, you get that cool whistling sound of artillery shells. É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: Glenn Meyer <Gme...@trinity.edu>
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs
One brief comment: Why the cruise missles? What's the purpose with such What's the proposed target set? Do you really think we Any significant opponent faced with a large invasion fleet Remember the Brits splashed a Styx in the Gulf on the way to Last, as pointed out - intimidation value is minimal bye É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Paul J. Adam" <p...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk>
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs
In article <1998070218115700.OAA14...@ladder03.news.aol.com>, Krztalizer >I was passing through the Phillipines when there was a local Go to the Imperial War Museum in London, and they've got two 15"/42s >commotion at the base when a storekeeper found some incredible number of >forgotten 16"/50 barrels, at a time when the Navy's BB program was spoiling >back up for the 1980s. Everyone on the base went over to check out the >behemoth weapons that had lain forgotten for decades at the sprawling supply >facility. Those fangs look huuuuuuuge, even pulled out of the turrets. outside flanking the path into the building. Stand near them, and the shells they fired, and you understand why 77-man turret crews were vital. -- É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: "Dave Welsh" <dwe...@deltanet.com>
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs
Krztalizer wrote in message <1998070208425900.EAA05...@ladder01.news.aol.com>... >>Proposal: >>Build up to 6 monitors using the turrets from 2 of the Iowas. Each monitor >>The monitor should be a 25 knot 10,000 ton ship with a reasonable outfit Also remember that Monitor's sank in heavy >weather. Not a good trait to recreate. Even the WWII monitors were quite seaworthy, just not very fast or agile. >Perhaps we should consider modifying Hooray! Don't forget those ballistae and catapults too!! >your idea in some way to include SeaShadow ("CSS Virginia ver 2000") technology >as well. If you want to really use all the old supplies, I might suggestyou >could even fill the magazines with grape shot, and find a way to recreate Greek >Fire.. Seriously, using old supplies is not the issue -- it's using an existing gun system. The shells and charges aren't that difficult to make. The guns are. Have you ever seen a gun lathe that size? Dave Welsh É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: velov...@aol.com (Velovich)
Data: 1998/07/02
Assunto: Re: New Monitors not BBs
Look - last I heard, Marines afloat are grouped much as carrier groups are.
Correct me if I'm wrong... So - there will be other combatants. That is, other targets. IF this I'm just an ARMY grunt, and I know this much. If you want to argue just to >At 25 >knots, for example, the Navy probably wouldn't consider this ship to be well, how fast are gator freighters? do they go 30+ kts? And as far as >fast enough to operate on smash and dash missions, and it would bog down a >carrier group. carriers, they and this won't be found together, so there's no need to go that fast!!! Differing missions, even thought there is overlap. >Without a carrier to provide air cover, is this thing going to have such Agian, most large USN vessels (correct me if I'm wrong) travel in groups. So >good AA gear that it will not need help? each member of the group can contribute to the overall defence. Instead of focussing on high-end, massive systems that a dedicated platform 1 Standard twin arm launcher The helo could only support the group's ASW effort. The guy has an idea that, just as the Air Farce is screwing over the Army in >Another unfortunate Unless IQs dropped suddenly as the temps went up, it does make some sense >complication is that the ship can bombard inland only in relation to how >close it can get to the shore. Thus, to hit 45 miles inland it could only >be 5 miles offshore. That brings it within easy range of shore-to-ship >missiles. that the Monitor would start firing up the beach first. This would have the increased, very positive benefit of suppressing anti-grunt defences as well as the anti ship defences... Someone will correct me here if I missed something... > And it doesn't have heavy armor... Don't need it! Over the Horizon is easily done. Overhead imagery can ID > (a complication for most ship to shore Bull hockey. USAF and Army A/C dodge Army Arty all the time. Unless the >bombardment). Navy can't figure out how to do this too, no problem. > To hit shore site from over the horizon with >your guns you Already in the inventory - just need a few more. >need targeting capability. Maybe some >UAVs would assist there (Kaching goes >the cash register). >And to give an idea of what the Navy thinks is reasonable for crew costs, If DD-21 can be highly automated, so can a monitor. >the new DD-21 class is not supposed to have more than 95 crew (and quite >possibly less). <*> Velovich NOTICE TO BULK E-MAILERS: Pursuant to US Code, Title 47, Chapter 5, Subchapter É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: dkraNOSPAMm...@www.zap.hr (Drazen Kramaric)
Data: 1998/07/01
Assunto: Re: British subs in WWII
On Wed, 24 Jun 1998 00:06:12 +0100, "Paul J. Adam" <p...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk> wrote: I know that. I searched for "Tiger" in hope I'll find a reference to >I know two HMS Tigers, but they weren't submarines :) I can't find a WW2 >T-boat called 'Tiger". u-boat sunk by "Tiger"in Indian Ocea waters, but I found nothing. Drax for reply, delete NOSPAM from my e-mail address É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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