: :-)  I figured that when I was writing my message.  "So when are the
: marines going to storm a beach..."
: Umm... never.  That's what vertical envelopment is for...

I'm actually surprised that my little comment did not invite down lots of
attacks.  The truth is, amphibious assault has not been used for a long
time.  The more recent incarnations (like Haiti) involved landing at
secure beaches and airports.  Nobody has had to fight over a beach since
(I think) Inchon.

In fact, the Marines themselves have moved away from the idea.  That's
what is meant by vertical envelopment.  Indeed, the reason they want the
V-22 is to not only avoid the beach, but to move the invasion force even
deeper inland than the helos can reach.  So why is naval gunfire support
necessary if you are not going to storm the beach in the first place?  It
isn't, which is a good explanation for why it does not get funded.  (An
aside:  this does not mean that the only reason things do not get funded
is because they are not needed--minehunting is needed, but the Navy
doesn't like the mission and always underfunds it).

There are some sacred cows out there worth attacking.  Recently here there
was discussion about whether the Marine Corps is still needed.  It is
also an argument that needs hearing.  But what the Marine Corps has shown
that it is consistently capable of doing is reinventing itself to do new
things.  It INVENTED amphibious warfare during World War II.  Now it is
abandoning it.  The Corps evolves.  Naval strategy that pertains to the
Corps' mission evolves too.

Guy Derdall arose from his bed of nails and chastised me severely via
E-mail....

No, cuz the historical records list the ships firing on various
targets.  Morison, take him as you will and I'll take him any time (and
he like BB fire support), the easiest and most accessible, describes the
fire of individual ships against individual batteries, beach exits,
etc..  Try reading.  Learning flows therefrom.

Just a quick note with a few hard cold facts....

No, I've never served in (Incidentally, one serves "in", never "on" a
vessel) a BB, but have tours in a CVA and a MSO, along with 2 week
stints at sea on DDs, a DLG, an LST, a AD(actually underway-a rarity),
and most fun, harbor tugs.  My background was in Operations and Weapons
("Gunnery") Departments.  I received my qualifying letter as an OOD (in
"all types of steaming") from the CO of a carrier as an Ensign, one of
two in the Atlantic Fleet at the time, since ensign-OODs on carriers
were and are rare.  After release from 3.5 years active duty in '65, I
stayed (off an on)in the reserves till '87, getting a little promotion
and finally retirement. That's about the same or less experience than a
lot of folks here.  You asked?  What did you expect?  I got my wise-ass
mouth dealing with sea lawyers and seagoers.

That's a lot of sea time and a personal familiarity with a few ship
types.

I'm familiar with your comparable experience, set fort here: (       ).

As for the retired RM1 who posts on USNFSA matters, his experience
includes the claim of a BB which made greater than design/trials speed
to straighten a shaft, a claim that brought howls of laughter from
nearly every former serving sailor/officer who posts to smn.

The "Congressional Briefings", serious though they may have seemed to
those embarked upon a mission to which they are dedicated, were likely a
sad joke, a travesty, a "dog and pony show" which to those of us who
deal with Congress on a regular basis in other fields (I do, having
served as a national officer of a large housing and community
development lobbying group, a city council member and now as the manager
of a regional trade association lobbying state legislatures) are all too
familiar, the partial attention of a couple of members of the House,
listening out of politeness AKA "keeping the voters happy", being among
the least sincere audiences out there.

Sure, I make light of it and ridicule those who are so wrapped in a
dream world as to fail to understand that the BBs are gone (and not
before their time).

Persistently and adamantly, you refuse to recognize the reality conveyed
by almost every former serving USN officer and the handful of foreign
professionals who post to smn.  To a man, they sign on to a simple
maxim, that the era of the BB is over.  Almost every one provides a
lower estimate of the effects of 16" fire than that to which you
subscribe and adhere.  Generally, the "gunners" among them emphasize the
"ordnance on target/RoF" factors, point to the simple equation that the
performance of the 16" gun against "hardened" targets is largely negated
in the absence of "hardened" targets, and while acknowledging the range
margin of the 16", point out that a variety of "boosted" alternatives
for smaller bore projectiles negate that margin.

You, on the other hand, espouse simplistic and patently, transparently
fallacious and naive arguments, that, worldwide, all the "empowered"
naval strategists since about 1943 have been wrong, that the US and
other armies have erred in retiring ALL their "big" guns (with the 155mm
becoming the largest cannon in inventory, with today's 155s being
immeasurably smaller and lighter than their predecessors), that armies
started out with 75mm as their big guns (an absolute falsehood,
undeserving of comment except to urge you to read almost any book by Ian
Hogg, sort of the "high priest" of popular writers interested in
artillery on land or sea), that there is great professional outcry and
need for FS occupying higher priority than AAW, ASW, logistics and a
dozen other naval missions, and that, somehow, a BB or modern
recreation/equivalent thereof would add to fleet assets capabilities
greater than those which she would consume in crewing, operations and
protection.

You're wrong, Guy, ridiculously but excusably, because your perspective
is formed from a wide-eyed innocence and naiveté, and by a lack of the
sophistication conveyed only by experience, familiarity and/or research.

For example:

Certainly, the presence of a BB (or equivalent thereof) would add to the
potential success of an over-the-beach amphibious assault.  How much
would it add?  In the eyes of naval planners less than the equation of
cost (startup and operational) v. return divided by the necessity and
number of anticipated assaults.

When the Navy's "new" 8" gun program (a not very well thought out
adventure at pleasing FS and ship to ship gunnery advocates) hit the
rocks a couple of decades ago, after a single example emplaced aboard a
FORREST SHERMAN class DD proved UNSAT in almost all respects
(potentially almost as harmful to the shooter as to the shootee), in the
words of old GJCaesar, "Iacta est alea."  The fate and future of the big
gun in the USN was sealed.  Contemporaneously, for whatever reason, the
Soviets, practitioners of over the beach amphibious tactics till then
mounters of 130mm tubes on all sorts of new construction, began to
center upon 100mm as their largest naval gun for future ships.  Around
the world, except for the report (true or misinterpretation, the
follow-up was interesting) of a Japanese 175mm, no navy seems involved
in planning or funding anything bigger than a "diminutive" 155mm, and
even then with modest commitment and moderate expectations.

Is verybody else wrong?  Are you, handful of never-been-to-seas, a
whaleboat full of former BBs sailors, the usual handful of Marines (a
group which history will tell you are created and trained to be
short-sighted 'cuz it helps to be that way when ordered to do that which
they must do) and poor John (whose deeper problems become apparent in
rereading some of his posts), disciples of the true and authentic
version of the naval gospel of "What Ought To Be"?

In the past, for VietNam, the 80s naval buildup/Gulf War, BBs were
recommissioned because they were available, crewable (with a call for
volunteers from among an older bunch trained in their power plants and
systems), operable at reasonable cost, politically appealing, and
believed capable of adding to the accomplishment of missions at hand.

In the cold, hard light of day, the modest GFS success of a BB in
VietNam did not match costs or other priorities (whatever the statement
by Warner whose veracity as with that of all politicians may be
classified as "situational").

        When the British opposition attacked the burning of the public
buildings in Washington, the government defended it on the grounds that it
was in specific retaliation for the destruction of the parliament building
at York (Toronto) in 1813.

Suffering Christ!  Signs of intelligence!

Stay me with flagons...

Jeff

--

In article <6fu6mf$54...@hpbs1500.boi.hp.com>, Jeff Crowell
<jc...@boi.hp.com> writes

Still, I represent the suggestion that I'd send anyone on a hazardous
mission armed only with a nine-mil pistol. While not a bad round, and a
handy backup, it's still a .45ACP set for "stun".

--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...            

:) You know what we need? S.M.N. tee shirts, fully illustrated with cartoons of
the USTAFISH crew...

Ethan T.               40degrees37'09.1" North     111degrees49'01.6" West    

Oooooo!

This, I like.

Jeff

.

Ethan T.               40degrees37'09.1" North     111degrees49'01.6" West    

In article <6fu6t4$54...@hpbs1500.boi.hp.com>, jc...@boi.hp.com (Jeff

In article <01bd5cab$be438160$LocalHost@fred>, bfl...@coastnet.com says...