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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: Jeremy Hogue <z0...@ttacs.ttu.edu>
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.
On 29 Jan 1997, Andrew Toppan wrote: > Ken & Laura Chaddock reshaped the electrons to say: Would it have even been possible for the IJN to provide enough qualified > > I think a lot of you are missing the point. If Japan had started the > > war with 6 or 7 more Shokaku class fleet carriers, ... > They would have started the war sometime in 1943 or '44, by which time the carrier pilots to man the planes on 7 or 8 additional fleet carriers with their pre-war training regimen? I mean it took over 500 hours of flying, plus ground schooling, to qualify as a pilot. Not to mention, providing enough planes with the pre-war aviation industry? Anyways, that's my two cents worth. É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk ("Ken Young")
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.
In article <5coa13$...@dailyplanet.wam.umd.edu>, v...@umail.umd.edu (Prof Vince Brannigan) wrote: Sorry Vince Tirpitz was not sunk by subs she was immobilised and later > so what? TIRPITZ was sunk by tiny subs > GLORIOUS could have been sunk by a light cruiser. proves nothing > except that failure to be alert is fatal in wartime. sunk by aircraft. Ken Young É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: v...@umail.umd.edu (Prof Vince Brannigan)
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.
In article <E4y550....@cix.compulink.co.uk>, >In article <5coa13$...@dailyplanet.wam.umd.edu>, v...@umail.umd.edu (Prof I was wrong. I was under the ipression that she had settled to the bottom of >Vince Brannigan) wrote: >> so what? TIRPITZ was sunk by tiny subs her mooring in much the samey way as the QE in alexandria, but that is not correct. Tirpitz was repaired, at least in part and was preparing to steam when whe was É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: cxt...@psu.edu (Cheng Tseng)
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.
Ah, they still had maneuvering room. It is just that the Japanese refused to
take the alternative, and some fellows in the FDR administration enforced the embargo a little too fanatically. Incidentally, the Japanese never comtemplated the idea that if the JUST attacked the Dutch and British, the U.S. probably never would have intervened against them. And considering all the reserve of oil the Japanese had, they could have launched the war later, all right, except this time they would have run into significant amounts of new U.S. construction. They just had to be more efficient about using the oil. C.T. É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: Jeremy Hogue <z0...@ttacs.ttu.edu>
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.
The problem with that is that the U.S. bases in the Phillipines would
have been able to interdict the flow of oil and raw materials from South East Asia and Indonesia. Don't forget, the U.S. intervened against Germany over a year before the Germans declared war on the U.S. Since Hitler wasn't going to provoke America, Roosevelt was darn sure going to provoke the Japanese into beginning hostilities against America. Threatening to cut the Japanese supply lines with forces stationed in the Philipines would have done the trick. Don't forget, that's where the Roosevelt administration expected the Japanese to attack first. Anyways, again that's my two cents worth on the subject. É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: cxt...@psu.edu (Cheng Tseng)
Data: 1997/02/02
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.
In article <Pine.PMDF.3.91.970201103112.539043859D-100...@ttacs.ttu.edu> Jeremy Hogue <z0...@ttacs.ttu.edu> writes: >The problem with that is that the U.S. bases in the Phillipines would Yeah, Roosevelt would try to provoke the Japanese into commencing hostilities >have been able to interdict the flow of oil and raw materials from South >East Asia and Indonesia. >Don't forget, the U.S. intervened against Germany over a year before the >Germans declared war on the U.S. Since Hitler wasn't going to provoke >America, Roosevelt was darn sure going to provoke the Japanese into >beginning hostilities against America. Threatening to cut the Japanese >supply lines with forces stationed in the Philipines would have done the >trick. Don't forget, that's where the Roosevelt administration expected >the Japanese to attack first. >Anyways, again that's my two cents worth on the subject. against the United States, and the Phillipines were in a position to interdict any Japanese traffic from the East Indies, but a strong case can be made that the U.S. and Roosevelt would have done preciously little to help, if the Japanese just attacked the British and the Dutch. Domestic opinions and Congressional positions alone would have kept that from happening. Incidentally, I do not think the word "intervene" applies to our action against the Germans. C.T. É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: j...@athena.mit.edu (Joseph C Wang)
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Pearl Harbor in the Taiwan Straits
In article <32F22C40.3...@bc.sympatico.ca>, >It seems to me that its a bit tight for carrier operations. Would the What's more, you will be fighting with one hand tied behind your back. >senior naval and military leadersip advise the president to do this? Is >any president going to put a carrier at risk against professional >advice? After all these things do have a way of becoming public. This "what-if" assumes that hostilities haven't broken out, and this greatly reduces what you can do. The PRC can send out ships and aircraft to find out exactly where you are, and you can't fire on them. If you submerge your submarine or just stop in the straits, the PRC can claim that you are contravening the right of innocent passage. -- É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: mic...@aol.com
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Command Relationships on a CV
In article <5cqbl7$...@news.asu.edu>, au...@imap2.asu.edu writes: this had nothing to do with command relationships on a CV... >: The ship's CO and the CAG are considered equals & in most cases except for >: date of rank are. They both work for the BG Commander who will be embarked >: on the CV. The air Boss is ship's company, thus reports to the CV CO. >: Hope this helps. > And they both increasingly work for a "unified commander" who No, more likely a "superduper ComFlt or ComTF flag", if not the actual >will be, most likely, an AF flag officer with a Navy shorebased >"superduper CAG" as an adviser. ComFlt himself. >During Desert Storm, for example, much So did a few other folks - like Com7thFlt for example. >navy air effort was directed by the air planners in Riyadh, who were >'advised' by a senior Navy type who, for intents and purposes, had >overrule capability against any CVBG admiral in the region. >No, the Did you take the time to explain why guys were pushing around little scale >staffs afloat don't like this kind of set up, but control from afar is >the wave of the future. Mission Planning systems coming down the pike >even tell you how to park the planes on the deck, I once talked to some >AF types who were *highly* amused at guys pushing around little scale >models. models, or did you find it *highly* amusing also? Mike Weeks MIC...@aol.com É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: Malcolm Clarke <Pus...@clarkeassoc.demon.co.uk>
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: USTAFISH I crew in horblower remake Re: Scenes in Hornblower Movies
In article <plburton.765.0125F...@mail.goodnet.com>, Sue Thing >However, since my Russian accent is far and away better than my British one, fleas? Hmmm Hmph >*************************************** >"Canister on top of the round shot, sir. > _Hornblower and the Hotspur_ >*************************************** Regards "If you can't convince them, Malcolm Confuse them". É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: p...@adan.kingston.net (Peter Skelton)
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Coriolis effect - Some rambling thoughts
eug...@dynagen.co.za (Eugene Griessel) wrote: <snip> >An earlier posting about the Coriolis Effect and the Battle of the >Falklands set me to thinking. I am not a Gunner (thank the Lord) so I >really know little about it. But I suppose, logically, the Coriolis >effect must influence the flight of a shell somewhat. >Firstly I hauled out everything I had on the Falklands. Sturdee in Coriolis would make a shell tend to drift one way in the Northern There was no setting for it on any of the fire control equipment of the day On the British tables there was a correction for drift, the tendancy of the -- É necessário Acessar antes de postar mensagens.
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