Battleships as escorts.
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Battleships as escorts.  
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1.  Jeremy Hogue  
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 Mais opções 1 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: Jeremy Hogue <z0...@ttacs.ttu.edu>
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.

On 29 Jan 1997, Andrew Toppan wrote:

> Ken & Laura Chaddock reshaped the electrons to say:
> >    I think a lot of you are missing the point. If Japan had started the
> > war with 6 or 7 more Shokaku class fleet carriers, ...

> They would have started the war sometime in 1943 or '44, by which time the
> US Navy would have built up more, and the result would have been the same.

Would it have even been possible for the IJN to provide enough qualified
carrier pilots to man the planes on 7 or 8 additional fleet carriers with
their pre-war training regimen?  I mean it took over 500 hours of flying,
plus ground schooling, to qualify as a pilot.  Not to mention, providing
enough planes with the pre-war aviation industry?  Anyways, that's my two
cents worth.

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2.  "Ken Young"  
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 Mais opções 1 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk ("Ken Young")
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.

In article <5coa13$...@dailyplanet.wam.umd.edu>, v...@umail.umd.edu (Prof

Vince Brannigan) wrote:
> so what? TIRPITZ was sunk by tiny subs
>  GLORIOUS could have been sunk by a light cruiser.  proves nothing
> except that failure to be alert is fatal in wartime.  

Sorry Vince Tirpitz was not sunk by subs she was immobilised and later
sunk by aircraft.

Ken Young
ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk
With Capitalism; man exploits man
With Socialism; the reverse occurs


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3.  Prof Vince Brannigan  
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 Mais opções 1 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: v...@umail.umd.edu (Prof Vince Brannigan)
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.

In article <E4y550....@cix.compulink.co.uk>,
   ken...@cix.compulink.co.uk ("Ken Young") wrote:

>In article <5coa13$...@dailyplanet.wam.umd.edu>, v...@umail.umd.edu (Prof
>Vince Brannigan) wrote:

>> so what? TIRPITZ was sunk by tiny subs
>>  GLORIOUS could have been sunk by a light cruiser.  proves nothing
>> except that failure to be alert is fatal in wartime.  
>Sorry Vince Tirpitz was not sunk by subs she was immobilised and later
>sunk by aircraft.

I was wrong.  I was under the ipression that she had settled to the bottom of
her mooring in much the samey way as the QE in alexandria, but that is not
correct.  

Tirpitz was repaired, at least in part and was preparing to steam when whe was
bombed by RN aircraft from fleet and Excort carriers on 3 april 1944.
she was further attacked by the air several times.  sept 15 she was hit by the
first of the tallboy bombs and further dmaged.  she then steamed to tromsoe
at this point she was put in a sand berth as a battery.  however she was
technicaly afloat, not grounded.  She was sunk on 12 november by lancasters.


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4.  Cheng Tseng  
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 Mais opções 1 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: cxt...@psu.edu (Cheng Tseng)
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.

Ah, they still had maneuvering room.  It is just that the Japanese refused to
take the alternative, and some fellows in the FDR administration enforced the
embargo a little too fanatically.
Incidentally, the Japanese never comtemplated the idea that if the JUST
attacked the Dutch and British, the U.S. probably never would have intervened
against them.  And considering all the reserve of oil the Japanese had, they
could have launched the war later, all right, except this time they would have
run into significant amounts of new U.S. construction.  They just had to be
more efficient about using the oil.

C.T.


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5.  Jeremy Hogue  
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 Mais opções 1 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: Jeremy Hogue <z0...@ttacs.ttu.edu>
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.

The problem with that is that the U.S. bases in the Phillipines would
have been able to interdict the flow of oil and raw materials from South
East Asia and Indonesia.  
Don't forget, the U.S. intervened against Germany over a year before the
Germans declared war on the U.S.  Since Hitler wasn't going to provoke
America, Roosevelt was darn sure going to provoke the Japanese into
beginning hostilities against America.  Threatening to cut the Japanese
supply lines with forces stationed in the Philipines would have done the
trick.  Don't forget, that's where the Roosevelt administration expected
the Japanese to attack first.
Anyways, again that's my two cents worth on the subject.

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6.  Cheng Tseng  
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 Mais opções 2 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: cxt...@psu.edu (Cheng Tseng)
Data: 1997/02/02
Assunto: Re: Battleships as escorts.

In article <Pine.PMDF.3.91.970201103112.539043859D-100...@ttacs.ttu.edu> Jeremy Hogue <z0...@ttacs.ttu.edu> writes:

>The problem with that is that the U.S. bases in the Phillipines would
>have been able to interdict the flow of oil and raw materials from South
>East Asia and Indonesia.  
>Don't forget, the U.S. intervened against Germany over a year before the
>Germans declared war on the U.S.  Since Hitler wasn't going to provoke
>America, Roosevelt was darn sure going to provoke the Japanese into
>beginning hostilities against America.  Threatening to cut the Japanese
>supply lines with forces stationed in the Philipines would have done the
>trick.  Don't forget, that's where the Roosevelt administration expected
>the Japanese to attack first.
>Anyways, again that's my two cents worth on the subject.

Yeah, Roosevelt would try to provoke the Japanese into commencing hostilities
against the United States, and the Phillipines were in a position to interdict
any Japanese traffic from the East Indies, but a strong case can be made that
the U.S. and Roosevelt would have done preciously little to help, if the
Japanese just attacked the British and the Dutch.  Domestic opinions and
Congressional positions alone would have kept that from happening.
Incidentally, I do not think the word "intervene" applies to our action
against the Germans.

C.T.


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Pearl Harbor in the Taiwan Straits  
1.  Joseph C Wang  
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 Mais opções 1 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: j...@athena.mit.edu (Joseph C Wang)
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Pearl Harbor in the Taiwan Straits

In article <32F22C40.3...@bc.sympatico.ca>,
Grant Tomlinson  <grant_tomlin...@bc.sympatico.ca> wrote:

>It seems to me that its a bit tight for carrier operations.  Would the
>senior naval and military leadersip advise the president to do this?  Is
>any president going to put a carrier at risk against professional
>advice?  After all these things do have a way of becoming public.

What's more, you will be fighting with one hand tied behind your back.
This "what-if" assumes that hostilities haven't broken out, and this
greatly reduces what you can do.  The PRC can send out ships and
aircraft to find out exactly where you are, and you can't fire on
them.  If you submerge your submarine or just stop in the straits, the
PRC can claim that you are contravening the right of innocent passage.

--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----
Joseph Wang                Globewide Network Academy
j...@mit.edu                Thousands of distance education courses and programs
http://www.gnacademy.org   At your fingertips


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Command Relationships on a CV  
1.  micoma  
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 Mais opções 1 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: mic...@aol.com
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Command Relationships on a CV

In article <5cqbl7$...@news.asu.edu>, au...@imap2.asu.edu writes:
>: The ship's CO and the CAG are considered equals & in most cases except
for
>: date of rank are.  They both work for the BG Commander who will be
embarked
>: on the CV.  The air Boss is ship's company, thus reports to the CV CO.
>: Hope this helps.

this had nothing to do with command relationships on a CV...

>    And they both increasingly work for a "unified commander" who
>will be, most likely, an AF flag officer with a Navy shorebased
>"superduper CAG" as an adviser.

No, more likely a "superduper ComFlt or ComTF flag", if not the actual
ComFlt himself.

>During Desert Storm, for example, much
>navy air effort was directed by the air planners in Riyadh, who were
>'advised' by a senior Navy type who, for intents and purposes, had
>overrule capability against any CVBG admiral in the region.

So did a few other folks - like Com7thFlt for example.

>No, the
>staffs afloat don't like this kind of set up, but control from afar is
>the wave of the future. Mission Planning systems coming down the pike
>even tell you how to park the planes on the deck, I once talked to some
>AF types who were *highly* amused at guys pushing around little scale
>models.

Did you take the time to explain why guys were pushing around little scale
models, or did you find it *highly* amusing also?

Mike Weeks MIC...@aol.com


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USTAFISH I crew in horblower remake Re: Scenes in Hornblower Movies  
1.  Malcolm Clarke  
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 Mais opções 1 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: Malcolm Clarke <Pus...@clarkeassoc.demon.co.uk>
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: USTAFISH I crew in horblower remake Re: Scenes in Hornblower Movies

In article <plburton.765.0125F...@mail.goodnet.com>, Sue Thing

>However, since my Russian accent is far and away better than my British one,
>and the character is more temperamentally suited,  I always saw myself more
>like the Russian countess in _Commodore Hornblower_. You know, the one who
>goes after HH's groceries?

Better not get too much into character, Sue - wasn't she infested with
fleas?  Hmmm Hmph

>***************************************
>Sue Thing      plbur...@goodnet.com

>"Canister on top of the round shot, sir.
> That'll learn 'em."

>       _Hornblower and the Hotspur_

>***************************************

--
Regards                         "If you can't convince them,    
Malcolm                          Confuse them".

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Coriolis effect - Some rambling thoughts  
1.  Peter Skelton  
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 Mais opções 1 fev 1997, 06:00
Grupos de notícias: sci.military.naval
De: p...@adan.kingston.net (Peter Skelton)
Data: 1997/02/01
Assunto: Re: Coriolis effect - Some rambling thoughts

eug...@dynagen.co.za (Eugene Griessel) wrote:
>An earlier posting about the Coriolis Effect and the Battle of the
>Falklands set me to thinking.  I am not a Gunner (thank the Lord) so I
>really know little about it.  But I suppose, logically,  the Coriolis
>effect must influence the flight of a shell somewhat.

>Firstly I hauled out everything I had on the Falklands.  Sturdee in
>his report makes reference to the poor shooting of the RN and the very
>accurate shooting of the German ships.  He attributes this lousy
>gunnery to the fact that the guns had never been fired at anything
>over 12000 yards and the range at the beginning of the engagement was
>16000 yards.  He also makes reference to pre-war training that
>concentrated on targets at 6000 yards.  Nothing about gunnery
>computers or the Coriolis effect.

<snip>

Coriolis would make a shell tend to drift one way in the Northern
Hemisphere and the other in the Southern. The magnitude of the effect would
depend on latitude.

There was no setting for it on any of the fire control equipment of the day
that I know of (German, British, American, or Japanese). For that matter I
don't think there was in WWII either. (Perhaps someone who's served on an
Iowa recently could verify that.) If the "force" is enough to make a
difference and there is no adjustment for it the equipment will only be
properly calibrated for one lattitude. If nobody had thought about it that
would be the situation. Something similar happened with magnetic exploders
for torpedoes at the beginning of WWII.

On the British tables there was a correction for drift, the tendancy of the
shells to move off line because of the spin imparted by the rifling. I
wonder if this was ascribed to the rifling but wholly or partly due to
Coriolis. In any event this adjustment could be tweaked by table for the
latitude to correct the computer.

--
Peter Skelton
Skelton & Associates
613/634-0230
p...@adan.kingston.net


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