>>>>People forget that until the Belgrano was sunk both sides were still
>>>>talking. By sinking a ship outside the exlusion zone it was guaranteed
>>>>that the war would go on until either the Argentinians were thrown off
>>>>the island or the British invasion failured.

>Yes, but before anyone is hasty to blame the British for "ruining" any chance
>of a negotiated peace by sinking the Belgrano, it should be clearly understood
>that both the Belgrano task group and the 25 de Mayo task group were "inbound"
>with intent to penetrate the exclusion zone in a coordinated operation
>designed to strike and sink as many British ships -- specifically the Hermes
>-- as possible.  They weren't sightseeing or meerly posturing.  Indeed, the 25
>de Mayo *would* have launched an airstrike, if not for the fact that light
>winds and a balky engineering plant kept her from generating enough wind over
>the bow for the Skyhawks.  

>If you take a step back beyond the operational naval considerations, and look
>at the political and diplomatic situation, it becomes even more clear that
>Galtieri and the junta had absolutely *no* intention of accepting any
>negotiated settlement that did not leave them possession of the islands.  The
>Argentine government played a card based on a classic set of wrong
>assumptions; they assumed the UK would not have the political resolve or real
>capabillity to contest the invasion; they thought public sentiment in the UK
>and international pressure would force the UK to a negotiated settlement
>leaving Argentina the islands; they thought that the US would at least be
>neutral, and possibly even pro-Argentina, unwilling to endanger Reagan's
>efforts to form a strong South American anti-communist coalition or
>unwilling to appear as supporting colonial claims; and last, but not least,
>Galtieri personally misjudged Thatcher, thinking that as a woman she wouldn't
>have the cahones for the fight.  Once committed, the Argentines *were not*
>going to back down without a fight, and they *honestly*, to the last minute,
>could not/would not believe that the British would successfully be able to
>retake the islands.  Galtieri, having taken the action largely for domestic
>political reasons, *could not* give them up to British control again without  
>loosing face and prestige -- which would almost surely have translated into a
>loss of power and more dissent at home.  On the other side of the world, once
>the Argentines landed, they presented the UK with a dilemma that they, or at
>least Margaret, could not let go --  no power can afford to have any part of
>its possessions seized by force without contest,or it will soon simply cease
>to have any power or standing in the community of nations.

>Yes, the sinking of the Belgrano escalated things to a level where sustained
>hostilities for control of the island were almost inevitable.  However, you
>can just as easily argue that if Argentina had earnestly wanted a peaceful
>resolution, then the *last* thing they should have done was deliberately
>challenge British resolve  by mounting a large-scale and coordinated offensive
>action in the direction of the British task force.  By any reasonable set of
>rules of military logic and procedure, the British were more than justified in
>nailing the Belgrano.

>Talks aside, some issues are destined to be determined by blood, when both
>sides have intrinsically contradictory aims and intentions.

> >>>People forget that until the Belgrano was sunk both sides were still
> >>>talking. By sinking a ship outside the exlusion zone it was guaranteed
> >>>that the war would go on until either the Argentinians were thrown off
> >>>the island or the British invasion failured.

> Yes, but before anyone is hasty to blame the British for "ruining" any chance
> of a negotiated peace by sinking the Belgrano, it should be clearly understood
> that both the Belgrano task group and the 25 de Mayo task group were "inbound"
> with intent to penetrate the exclusion zone in a coordinated operation
> designed to strike and sink as many British ships -- specifically the Hermes
> -- as possible.  They weren't sightseeing or meerly posturing.  Indeed, the 25
> de Mayo *would* have launched an airstrike, if not for the fact that light
> winds and a balky engineering plant kept her from generating enough wind over
> the bow for the Skyhawks.

> If you take a step back beyond the operational naval considerations, and look
> at the political and diplomatic situation, it becomes even more clear that
> Galtieri and the junta had absolutely *no* intention of accepting any
> negotiated settlement that did not leave them possession of the islands.  The
> Argentine government played a card based on a classic set of wrong
> assumptions; they assumed the UK would not have the political resolve or real
> capabillity to contest the invasion; they thought public sentiment in the UK
> and international pressure would force the UK to a negotiated settlement
> leaving Argentina the islands; they thought that the US would at least be
> neutral, and possibly even pro-Argentina, unwilling to endanger Reagan's
> efforts to form a strong South American anti-communist coalition or
> unwilling to appear as supporting colonial claims; and last, but not least,
> Galtieri personally misjudged Thatcher, thinking that as a woman she wouldn't
> have the cahones for the fight.  Once committed, the Argentines *were not*
> going to back down without a fight, and they *honestly*, to the last minute,
> could not/would not believe that the British would successfully be able to
> retake the islands.  Galtieri, having taken the action largely for domestic
> political reasons, *could not* give them up to British control again without
> loosing face and prestige -- which would almost surely have translated into a
> loss of power and more dissent at home.  On the other side of the world, once
> the Argentines landed, they presented the UK with a dilemma that they, or at
> least Margaret, could not let go --  no power can afford to have any part of
> its possessions seized by force without contest,or it will soon simply cease
> to have any power or standing in the community of nations.   Neither can a
> nation easily and openly abandon a group of its citizens -- even if a small
> and distant group -- who have effectively unanimously, and loudly and longly,
> clammored to remain a part of the empire.  (Indeed, one of the major
> roadblocks to a negotiated settlement with Argentina in previous years was the
> pernicious fact that the Falkland islanders most definitely *did not* want
> Argentia to rule them.  Many in the UK government would have like to have been
> rid of the problem long before 1982 . . . .)  What the UK may have one day
> willingly ceded in peace, it could not allow to be taken from them by overt
> aggression.

> Yes, the sinking of the Belgrano escalated things to a level where sustained
> hostilities for control of the island were almost inevitable.  However, you
> can just as easily argue that if Argentina had earnestly wanted a peaceful
> resolution, then the *last* thing they should have done was deliberately
> challenge British resolve  by mounting a large-scale and coordinated offensive
> action in the direction of the British task force.  By any reasonable set of
> rules of military logic and procedure, the British were more than justified in
> nailing the Belgrano.

> Talks aside, some issues are destined to be determined by blood, when both
> sides have intrinsically contradictory aims and intentions.

>There's something to be said:

>When I was out on my practical course for university at the administration  
>for recruiting Germany, they told me there were 4 steps of secrecy in the  
>German forces:

>- confidential
>- secret
>- top secret
>- NATO secret

>Is it the same with this classification in other NATO countries, or are  
>there any differences?