>>This sounds seriously flawed. Is the better to have an undefended
>>convoy grouped togather where the raider, fast and heavily armed,
>>catches two or three, (usually more if spains silver fleets are any
>>gauge) or sailing independantly, were each ship must be found?
>[snip]
>>Those who do not know their history are doomed to repeat it.
>Funny you should say that; the British had to learn convoy tactics the hard way
>during WWI and again at the beginning of WWII.  Convoys are the best method
>of protecting ships; sure, when a convoy is found, raiders are likely to have a
>field day, but finding a convoy is almost as hard as finding a single ship.  If all of
>the ships are travelling in convoy, the raiders have far fewer opportunities to make
>kills.  When they do, the escorts can chew them up; lone ships tend to get bush-
>whacked before help can arrive.
>-Mike Williams

>> >at least theoretically convoys make sense even if they are unescorted,
>> >since they concentrate the value and make it harder for the raider
>> >to find ships.  when the raider attacks the convoy "scatters"
>> >and the raider is only able to catch or sink a relative handfull
>> >of ships.  

>> This sounds seriously flawed. Is the better to have an undefended
>> convoy grouped togather where the raider, fast and heavily armed,
>> catches two or three, (usually more if spains silver fleets are any
>> gauge) or sailing independantly, were each ship must be found?

>> >submarines  and aircraft of course change the equations.

>> An element to be accounted for is the clandistine activities which
>> revealed information about the convoy to the raider. The phase "Loose
>> Lips Sink Ships" should be kept in mind when planning the startegy of
>> raider versus escort or lack of escort.
>> Those who do not know their history are doomed to repeat it.

>in the main, commerce raiding is an indirect,
>attrition oriented strategy.  The key issue is how much effort
>you put into protecting the shipping versus the effort to stop it.
>In the early 20th century commerce raiders without secure bases would prefer to attack unescorted
>independent ships, then tackle a convoy with any kind of escort.
>the risk of damage is simply too severe.  convoys represent a kind
>of concentration of targets.  The whole concept of a massed charge in
>infantgry tactics was to provide more targets than the defense could
>hit before they were overwhelmed.  The charging forces did not have to
>shoot to have the desired effect.  
>Unless a raider can really attack and sink the whole convoy at once
>in percentage terms it will find and sink more ships travelling
>alone.  As a practical matter useful captures e.g. supply ships,
>are much more likely from independant ships.
>BTW those discussing the WWII battle of the fauklands should remember
>that the german squadron was not engaged in commerce rading,
>but in traditional naval squadron activities.  The attack on the
>faulklans made no sense whatever from a commerce raiding point of view.

>erudn...@pica.army.mil (Ed Rudnicki) wrote:

>>In article <4ebca5$...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>,
>>Prof. Vince Brannigan <v...@umail.umd.edu> wrote:
>>>BTW those discussing the WWII battle of the fauklands should remember
>>>that the german squadron was not engaged in commerce rading,
>>>but in traditional naval squadron activities.  The attack on the
>>>faulklans made no sense whatever from a commerce raiding point of view.

>>Yes it did. It was a British port facility in a part of the world
>>where such were few and far between. Destroying it would have
>>hampered RN operations for at least a while, improving von Spee's
>>chances of further successful commerce raiding.

>>Ed Rudnicki      
>>erudn...@pica.army.mil
>>Oculis numquam claudentibus    
>erudn...@pica.army.mil (Ed Rudnicki) wrote:

>>In article <4ebca5$...@cville-srv.wam.umd.edu>,
>>Prof. Vince Brannigan <v...@umail.umd.edu> wrote:
>>>BTW those discussing the WWII battle of the fauklands should remember
>>>that the german squadron was not engaged in commerce rading,
>>>but in traditional naval squadron activities.  The attack on the
>>>faulklans made no sense whatever from a commerce raiding point of view.

>>Yes it did. It was a British port facility in a part of the world
>>where such were few and far between. Destroying it would have
>>hampered RN operations for at least a while, improving von Spee's
>>chances of further successful commerce raiding.

>1) exactly how do you "destroy" a port with a raiding cruiser squadron
>2) Von spee concentrated his ships for the raid, which reduced any
>commerce raiding potential, and brought all the targets in one place
>3  The Falklands are not on any major british trade route
>they are well south of Buenos aires, and the British also controlled
>tristan de cunha

>4) under the laws of war the UK could use neutral ports for coaling and
>repairs.  
>5) attacking a naval station would broadcast his presence
>If the Falklands are seriously defenced, von spee cannot attack
>if they are undefenced a single cruiser can land demolition teams and
>carry out any desired destruction.
> In maritime warfare a concentration of ships is not always a
>concentration of force.  

>In article <11d7cc$151ae....@news.comet.net> mwillia...@comet.net writes:
>>In <DLLtu6....@pica.army.mil>, erudn...@pica.army.mil (Ed Rudnicki) writes:
>>>Well, I think a better question is whether it's better to merely
>>>drive off the raider that tries to attack, allowing it to survive
>>>and raid another day (which is all that slow escorts could do), or
>>>to kill the raider once and for all (which is what the BC or other
>>>capable unit could do).

>>You have to weigh all of the facts, though;